uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Our research shows that network-based cache side-channel attacks are a realistic threat. Cache attacks have been traditionally used to leak sensitive data on a local setting (e.g., from an attacker-controlled virtual machine to a victim virtual machine that share the CPU cache on a cloud platform). With our attack called NetCAT, we show this threat extends to untrusted clients over the network, which can now leak sensitive data such as keystrokes in a SSH session from remote servers with no local access. The root cause of the vulnerability is a recent Intel feature called DDIO, which grants network devices and other peripherals access to the CPU cache. Originally, intended as a performance optimization in fast networks, we show DDIO has severe security implications, exposing servers in local untrusted networks to remote side-channel attacks. Increased peripheral performance is causing strain on the memory subsystem of modern processors. For example, available DRAM throughput can no longer sustain the traffic of a modern network card. Scrambling to deliver the promised performance, instead of transferring peripheral data to and from DRAM, modern Intel processors perform I/O operations directly on the Last Level Cache (LLC). While Direct Cache Access (DCA) instead of Direct Memory Access (DMA) is a sensible performance optimization, it is unfortunately implemented without care for security, as the LLC is now shared between the CPU and all the attached devices, including the network card. In this talk, we present the first security analysis of DDIO. Based on our analysis, we present NetCAT, the first network-based cache attack on the processor’s last-level cache of a remote machine. We show that NetCAT can break confidentiality of a SSH session from a third machine without any malicious software running on the remote server or client. The attacker machine does this by solely sending network packets to the remote server. netcat is also a famous utility that hackers and system administrators use to send information over the network. NetCAT is a pun on being able to read data from the network without cooperation from the other machine on the network. However, we received very mixed reactions on that pun. More details on this in the talk. The vulnerability was acknowledged by Intel with a bounty and CVE-2019-11184 was assigned to track this issue. The public disclosure was on September 10, 2019.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Practical Cache Attacks from the Network and Bad Cat Puns


Daniel Gruss

type: Person

cs: Informatika

de: Informatik

fi: tietojenkäsittelytiede

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

en: Computer Science

fr: Informatique

da: Datalogi

es: Ciencias de la Computación

nl: Informatica

cs: Technické vědy

de: Ingenieurwissenschaften

fi: tekniikka

uk: Інженерія

en: Engineering Sciences

fr: Ingénierie

da: Ingeniørvidenskab

es: Ingeniería

nl: Engineering

description: We present the next step after Rowhammer, a new software-based fault attack primitive: Plundervolt (CVE-2019-11157). Many processors (including the widespread Intel Core series) expose privileged software interfaces to dynamically regulate processor frequency and operating voltage. We show that these privileged interfaces can be reliably exploited to undermine the system's security. In multiple case studies, we show how the induced faults in enclave computations can be leveraged in real-world attacks to recover keys from cryptographic algorithms (including the AES-NI instruction set extension) or to induce memory safety vulnerabilities into bug-free enclave code. Fault attacks pose a substantial threat to the security of our modern systems, allowing to break cryptographic algorithms or to obtain root privileges on a system. Fortunately, fault attacks have always required local physical access to the system. This changed with the Rowhammer attack (BlackHat USA 2015, CCC 2015), which for the first time enabled an attacker to mount a software-based fault attack. However, as countermeasures against Rowhammer are developed and deployed, fault attacks require local physical access again. In this CCC talk, we present the next step, a long-awaited alternative to Rowhammer, a second software-based fault attack primitive: Plundervolt. Dynamic frequency and voltage scaling features have been introduced to manage ever-growing heat and power consumption in modern processors. Design restrictions ensure frequency and voltage are adjusted as a pair, based on the current load, because for each frequency there is only a certain voltage range where the processor can operate correctly. For this purpose, many processors (including the widespread Intel Core series) expose privileged software interfaces to dynamically regulate processor frequency and operating voltage. In this talk, we show that these privileged interfaces can be reliably exploited to undermine the system's security. We present the Plundervolt attack, in which a privileged software adversary abuses an undocumented Intel Core voltage scaling interface to corrupt the integrity of Intel SGX enclave computations. Plundervolt carefully controls the processor's supply voltage during an enclave computation, inducing predictable faults within the processor package. Consequently, even Intel SGX's memory encryption/authentication technology cannot protect against Plundervolt. In multiple case studies, we show how the induced faults in enclave computations can be leveraged in real-world attacks to recover keys from cryptographic algorithms (including the AES-NI instruction set extension) or to induce memory safety vulnerabilities into bug-free enclave code. We finally discuss why mitigating Plundervolt is not trivial, requiring trusted computing base recovery through microcode updates or hardware changes. We have responsibly disclosed our findings to Intel on June 7, 2019. Intel assigned CVE-2019-11157 to track this vulnerability and refer to mitigations. The scientific paper on Plundervolt will appear at the IEEE Security & Privacy Symposium 2020. The work is the result of a collaboration of Kit Murdock (The University of Birmingham, UK), David Oswald (The University of Birmingham, UK), Flavio D. Garcia (The University of Birmingham, UK), Jo Van Bulck (imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Belgium), Daniel Gruss (Graz University of Technology, Austria), and Frank Piessens (imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, Belgium).

TIB AV-Portal

type: Service

type: WebContent

type: MediaObject

@language: en

cs: přihlášení není vyžadováno

de: keine Anmeldung erforderlich

uk: вхід без авторизації

en: no login required

nl: geen login vereist

name: Plundervolt: Flipping Bits from Software without Rowhammer

Chaos Computer Club e.V.

type: Organization

cs: Video

de: Video

fi: Video

uk: Відео

en: Video

fr: Vidéo

da: Video

nl: Video

es: Video


Verkehrswende selber hacken

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Der Talk wird eine wilde Fahrt, vorbei an umfallenden Rollern, etwas Kunst mit Sharing-Daten, einer Shoppingtour aus Recherchegründen auf asiatischen Großhandelsplattformen, Sicherheitslücken in Fahrradschlössern, welche einen deutschen Bikesharer dazu bringen, seine 6000 Räder weltweit wieder einzusammeln, der Analyse von risikokapitalgetriebenen Sharingsystemen bis hin zum Gegenentwurf: Wie angewandte Lobbyarbeit für mehr offene Mobilitätsdaten aussieht. Und wie man es selbst in die Hand nehmen kann. Der Markt der Mobilitätsangebote ist in den letzten Jahren immer schneller immer größer geworden. Von einfachen Bikesharing-Rädern über E-Bikes, Lastenrädern hin zu Scootern bekommen wir in Großstädten immer mehr Möglichkeiten, ohne eigenes Gefährt trotzdem mobil zu sein. Aber warum nur in Großstädten? Wie nachhaltig ist das? Warum brauche ich immer noch 20 Apps für jede Stadt? Wie sehen diese Sharingsysteme eigentlich technisch aus? Was passiert mit den Daten und was lässt sich mit ihnen anfangen? Und warum sollten wir Mobilität eigentlich risikokapitalgetriebenen Technologieunternehmen überlassen? Daher bauen wir ein Open Source Bikesharingsystem: nicht profitorientiert und offen für alle, erprobt auf dem CCCamp19.

@language: de

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Modern grey-box fuzzers are the most effective way of finding bugs in complex code bases, and instrumentation is fundamental to their effectiveness. Existing instrumentation techniques either require source code (e.g., afl-gcc, ASan) or have a high runtime performance cost (roughly 10x slowdown for e.g., afl-qemu). We introduce Retrowrite, a binary rewriting framework that enables direct static instrumentation for both user-mode binaries and Linux kernel modules. Unlike dynamic translation and trampolining, rewriting code with Retrowrite does not introduce a performance penalty. We show the effectiveness of Retrowrite for fuzzing by implementing binary-only coverage tracking and ASan instrumentation passes. Our binary instrumentation achieves performance similar to compiler-based instrumentation. Fuzzing is the method of choice for finding security vulnerabilities in software due to its simplicity and scalability, but it struggles to find deep paths in complex programs, and only detects bugs when the target crashes. Instrumentation greatly helps with both issues by (i) collecting coverage feedback, which drives fuzzing deeper into the target, and (ii) crashing the target immediately when bugs are detected, which lets the fuzzer detect more bugs and produce more precise reports. One of the main difficulties of fuzzing closed-source software is that instrumenting compiled binaries comes at a huge performance cost. For example, simple coverage instrumentation through dynamic binary translation already incurs between 10x and 100x slowdown, which prevents the fuzzer from finding interesting inputs and bugs. In this talk we show how we used static binary rewriting for instrumentation: our approach has low overhead (comparable to compile-time instrumentation) but works on binaries. There are three main techniques to rewrite binaries: recompilation, trampoline insertion and reassembleable assembly. Recompilation is the most powerful but it requires expensive analysis and type recovery, which is an open/unsolved problem. Trampolines add a level of indirection and increase the size of the code, both of which have a negative impact on performance. Reassembleable assembly, the technique that we use, suffers from neither problem. In order to produce reassembleable assembly, we first disassemble the binary and then symbolize all code and data references (replacing offsets and references with references to unique labels). The output can then be fed to a standard assembler to produce a binary. Because symbolization replaces all references with labels, we can now insert instrumentation in the code and the assembler will fix the references for us when reassembling the binary. Symbolization is possible because references to code and global data always use RIP-relative addressing in the class of binaries that we support (position-independent x86_64 binaries). This makes it easy to distinguish between references and integer constants in the disassembly. We present Retrowrite, a framework for static binary rewriting that can add efficient instrumentation to compiled binaries and scales to real-world code. Retrowrite symbolizes x86_64 position-independent Linux binaries and emits reassembleable assembly, which can be fed to instrumentation passes. We implement a binary version of Address Sanitizer (ASan) that integrates with the source-based version. Retrowrite’s output can also be fed directly to AFL’s afl-gcc to produce a binary with coverage-tracking instrumentation. RetroWrite is openly available for everyone to use and we will demo it during the presentation. We also present kRetrowrite, which uses the same approach to instrument binary kernel modules for Linux. While many devices can be used with open-source drivers, some still require binary drivers. Device drivers are an inviting target for attackers because they run at the highest privilege level, and a buggy driver could result in full system compromise. kRetrowrite can instrument binary Linux modules to add kCov-based coverage tracking and KASan instrumentation.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: No source, no problem! High speed binary fuzzing


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Since the Snowden revelations the fear of stealthy hardware manipulations is no longer regarded as far fetched. This fear is also reflected in the massive discussions sparked by last year's Bloomberg allegations on a supposed hardware spy implant on Supermicro serverboards or the recent USA ban on Huawei telecommunication equipment. Hardware reverse engineering (HRE) is a promising method to detect such manipulations or hidden backdoors. However, HRE is a highly complex and cumbersome task. It takes months of work as well as expensive equipment to even obtain the netlist of a chip, the equivalent to the binary in software reverse engineering (SRE). In contrast to SRE where various paid or open-source tools for binary analysis exist, e.g., IDA Pro or Ghidra, in HRE simply no tool for netlist analysis were available - neither commercial, nor free. To close this gap, researchers from the Ruhr University Bochum developed HAL, the first open-source netlist analysis framework. In this talk, we start with a basic introduction into the challenges of HRE. Then, we demonstrate the capabilities of HAL before giving a brief overview on our current research with HAL. Hardware reverse engineering (HRE) is an important technique for analysts to understand the internals of a physical system. Use cases range from recovering interface specifications of old chips, over detection of malicious manipulations or patent infringements, to straight up counterfeiting. However, HRE is a notably complex and cumbersome task which consists of two phases: In the first phase the netlist, i.e., circuit description of a chip, has to be extracted from the physical device. Such a netlist is equivalent to the binary in software reverse engineering (SRE). In the second phase, the analyst then processes the netlist in order to understand (parts of) its functionality. However, obtaining a netlist from a chip can take several months and requires professional and costly equipment as well as expertise. Even with a recovered netlist, understanding its functionality is an enormously challenging task. This is partly due to the lack of proper tools for netlist analysis: While in SRE various commercial or open-source tools for binary analysis exist, e.g., IDA Pro or Ghidra, in HRE simply no tool for netlist analysis was available, neither commercial, nor free. To close this gap, researchers from the Embedded Security group of the Horst-Görtz Institute for IT-Security at the Ruhr University Bochum developed HAL, the first open-source netlist analysis framework. Inspired by the modularity of its SRE equivalents, HAL can be extended through optimized C++ plugins or directly used as a Python library, while at the same time offering a GUI for explorative and interactive analysis. The project is supposed to give hardware analysts a common platform for the development of new algorithms with a portable design, ultimately aiding both professionals in their daily work as well as researchers in their efforts to publish reproducible results. In this talk, we will first introduce the foundations and main challenges of HRE, before giving a live demonstration of HAL and some of its capabilities on selected case studies. We conclude the talk with a glimpse at our associated research at the university that spans both, technical research as well as cross-disciplinary work with psychologists. Our talk requires only minimum prior knowledge on digital hardware.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: HAL - The Open-Source Hardware Analyzer: A dive into the foundations of hardware reverse engineering and our netlist analysis framework HAL


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Hacking and hackers can be hard to visualize. In the popular imagination, the figure alternates between a menacing, hooded figure or some sort of drugged-out and depressed juvenile hero (or perhaps a state-sponsored hacker). To counter such images, a group of us have spearheaded a new digitally-based video project, Hack_Curio that features hacker-related videos, culled from a range of sources, documentary film, newscasts, hacker conference talks, advertising, and popular film. In this talk, the Hack-Curio creators and builders will briefly discuss the purpose and parameters of Hack_Curio and spend most of the talk featuring our funniest, most compelling videos around hacking from around the world. We will use these to reflect on some of the more obscure or less commented on cultural and political features of hacking--features that will address regional and international dimensions of the craft and its impacts around the world. Hacking and hackers can be hard to visualize. In the popular imagination, the figure alternates between a menacing, hooded figure or some sort of drugged-out and depressed juvenile hero (or perhaps a state-sponsored hacker). To counter such images, a group of us (Chris Kelty, Gabriella Coleman, and Paula Bialski) have spearheaded a new digitally-based video project, Hack_Curio that features hacker-related videos, culled from a range of sources, documentary film, newscasts, hacker conference talks, advertising, and popular film. In this talk, the Hack-Curio creators and builders, will briefly discuss the purpose and parameters of Hack_Curio and spend most of the talk featuring our funniest, most compelling videos around hacking from around the world. We will use these to reflect on some of the more obscure or less commented on cultural and political features of hacking--features that will address regional and international dimensions of the craft and its impacts around the world. We will begin our talk by telling the audience what drove to build this website and what we learned in the process of collaborating with now over fifty people to bring it into being. After our introduction, we will showcase about 7-10 videos drawn from quite different sources (ads, parodies, movie clips, documentary film, and talks) and from different parts of the world (Mexico, Germany, South Africa, France) in order to discuss the cultural significance of hacking in relation to regional and international commonalities and differences. Finally, we will finish with a short reflection on why such a project, based on visual artifacts, is a necessary corollary to text-based discussions, like books and magazines, covering the history and contemporary faces of hacking.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Hack_Curio: Decoding The Cultures of Hacking One Video at a Time


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Der Talk soll die Geschichte der senseBox von Beginn bis jetzt wiedergeben. Dabei möchte ich vor allem auf unsere Arbeit im Bereich Open Source, Open Data, Open Hardware und Open Educational Resources eingehen. Die Motivation von Teilnehmern des senseBox Projekts möchte ich basierend auf einer Nutzerstudie kurz wiedergeben. Außerdem möchte ich auf aktuelle Probleme sowie technische Hürden und die Genauigkeit der Daten eingehen. Zu guter Letzt gebe ich einen kurzen Ausblick in die Zukunft des Projekts. Mithilfe der senseBox, einem DIY Citizen Science Baukasten, kann jeder an der Forschung und Wissenschaft teilnehmen. Sei es durch die Messung von Umweltdaten, Analyse und Auswertung dieser Daten oder durch die Teilnahme an Diskussionen einer großen Community. Außerdem können Schülerinnen und Schüler durch die Nutzung von Open Educational Resources und einer visuellen Entwicklungsumgebung das Programmieren spielend erlernen. Dadurch wird nicht nur das Umweltverständnis, sondern auch die digitale Bildung gefördert. Die Hardware der senseBox basiert auf dem Konzept von Arduino und enthält neben dem Microcontroller noch weitere Umweltsensoren. Jegliche Projekte, von einer einfachen Wetterstation über ein intelligentes Bewässerungssystem für den Garten bis hin zu einer Wasserqualität-Boje in der Nordsee, sind durch die offene Arduino Plattform umsetzbar. Das Rückgrat der senseBox ist die openSenseMap. Das Backend sammelt die gesendeten Daten der senseBoxen aber auch anderer Geräte. Sensoren zur Luftqualität von Luftdaten.info oder HackAIR sowie alle anderen Geräte können ihre Sensordaten zur offenen API der openSenseMap senden. Die Webanwendung ermöglicht Visualisierungen und Analysemöglichkeiten. Die Daten sind über die API für jeden frei verfügbar und können somit unter anderem für die Klimaforschung genutzt werden. Das Projekt startete vor einigen Jahren als Studienprojekt an der Universität Münster. Nach mehreren Abschlussarbeiten, Projektwochen, Workshops und Förderperioden entstand aus einer einfachen Idee ein umfangreiches Toolkit. Die openSenseMap, auf welcher anfänglich einige Dutzend senseBoxen registriert waren, verzeichnete in den letzten 5 Jahren steigende Nutzerzahlen mit aktuell rund 5300 registrierten senseBoxen. Daraus resultieren Probleme, welche zu Beginn des Projekts nicht absehbar waren: die Webanwendung läuft inzwischen in der Cloud und fordert viel Rechen- und Speicherkapazität. Die Messdaten werden ineffizient in Datenbanken gespeichert, dadurch benötigt die Anwendung starke virtuelle Server. Der Talk soll die Geschichte der senseBox von Beginn bis jetzt wiedergeben. Dabei möchte ich vor allem auf unsere Arbeit im Bereich Open Source, Open Data, Open Hardware und Open Educational Resources eingehen. Die Motivation von Teilnehmern des senseBox Projekts möchte ich basierend auf einer Nutzerstudie kurz wiedergeben. Außerdem möchte ich auf aktuelle Probleme sowie technische Hürden und die Genauigkeit der Daten eingehen. Zu guter Letzt gebe ich einen kurzen Ausblick in die Zukunft des Projekts.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Offene Sensordaten für Jedermann - Ein Citizen Science Projekt basierend auf Open Source und Open Hardware


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Most modern embedded devices have something to protect: Whether it's cryptographic keys for your bitcoins, the password to your WiFi, or the integrity of the engine-control unit code for your car. To protect these devices, vendors often utilise the latest processors with the newest security features: From read-out protections, crypto storage, secure-boot up to TrustZone-M on the latest ARM processors. In this talk, we break these features: We show how it is possible to bypass the security features of modern IoT/embedded processors using fault-injection attacks, including breaking TrustZone-M on the new ARMv8-M processors. We are also releasing and open-sourcing our entire soft- and hardware toolchain for doing so, making it possible to integrate fault-injection testing into the secure development lifecycle. Modern devices, especially secure ones, often rely on the security of the underlying silicon: Read-out protection, secure-boot, JTAG locking, integrated crypto accelerators or advanced features such as TrustZone are just some of the features utilized by modern embedded devices. Processor vendors are keeping up with this demand by releasing new, secure processors every year. Often, device vendors place a significant trust into the security claims of the processors. In this talk, we look at using fault-injection attacks to bypass security features of modern processors, allowing us to defeat the latest chip security measures such as TrustZone-M on the new ARMv8 processors. After a quick introduction into the theory of glitching, we introduce our fully open-source FPGA platform for glitching: An FPGA-based glitcher with a fully open-source toolchain & hardware, making glitching accessible to a wider audience and significantly reducing the costs of getting started with it - going as far as being able to integrate glitch-testing into the Secure Development Lifecycle of a product. Then, we look at how to conduct glitching attacks on real-world targets, beyond academic environments, including how to prepare a device for glitching and how to find potential glitch targets. Afterwards, we demonstrate fault-injection vulnerabilities we found in modern, widely-used IoT/embedded processors and devices, allowing us to bypass security features integrated into the chip, such as: - Re-enabling locked JTAG - Bypassing a secure bootloader - Recovering symmetric crypto keys by glitching the AES implementation - Bypassing secure-boot - Fully bypassing TrustZone-M security features on some new ARMv8M processors We will also demonstrating how to bypass security features and how to break the reference secure bootloader of the Microchip SAM L11, one of the newest, TrustZone-M enabled ARM Cortex-M processors, using roughly $5 of equipment. After the talk, PCBs of our hardware platform will be given out to attendees.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: TrustZone-M: Hardware attacks on ARMv8-M security features


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: We will analyze the approach to tecnology (decisional method, mesh network and cloud) of a farming community near Bologna: Campi Aperti. Speaking about: human organization, connectivity, managing of a server, resources and incidents handler, femminism, maintaining and growing in a non-gerarchical organization. Technologies involved: humans, antennas, orchestrator of containers. Summarize the experience of this last 15 years of a group of farmers, the strong political impact about take care of the near territory, decide what grow and what eat and share this decisions with the consumers in the city, settled a method that is called "shared warranty", garanzia partecipata, for the organic vegetables, refuse the big distribution of the food and how this principles, with also some femminist ideas, can bring us to think in a different way our tech organizations and our tools. In the last 3 years the group Campiaperti and Genuino Clandestino, the italian network of self-managed farmers, started to make questions and solution about tecnologies and started slowly to mantain their services.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Infrastructures in a horizontal farmers community: Human agreements, comunication infrastructures, services in Campi Aperti, Bologna, Italy


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Listening Back’ is an add-on for the Chrome and Firefox browsers that sonifies internet cookies in real time as one browses online. By translating internet cookies into sound, the ‘Listening Back’ browser add-on provides an audible presence for hidden infrastructures that collect personal and identifying data by storing a file on one’s computer. Addressing the proliferation of ubiquitous online surveillance and the methods by which our information flows are intercepted by mechanisms of automated data collection, ‘Listening Back’ functions to expose real-time digital surveillance and consequently the ways in which our everyday relationships to being surveilled have become normalised. This lecture performance will examine Internet cookies as a significant case study for online surveillance with their invention in 1994 being historically situated at the origins of automated data collection, and the commercialisation of the World Wide Web. I will integrate online browsing to demonstrate the ‘Listening Back’ add-on and explore it’s potential to reveal algorithmic data capture processes that underlie our Web experience. ‘Listening Back’ is an add-on for the Chrome and Firefox browsers that sonifies internet cookies in real time as one browses online. Utilising digital waveform synthesis, ‘Listening Back’ provides an audible presence for hidden infrastructures that collect personal and identifying data by storing a file on one’s computer. By directing the listener’s attention to hidden processes of online data collection, Listening Back functions to expose real-time digital surveillance and consequently the ways in which our everyday relationships to being surveilled have become normalised. Our access to the World Wide Web is mediated by screen devices and ‘Listening Back’ enables users to go beyond the event on the screen and experience some of the algorithmic surveillance processes that underlie our Web experience. This project therefore explores how sound can help us engage with complex phenomena beyond the visual interface of our smart devices by highlighting a disconnect between the graphical interface of the Web, and the socio-political implications of background mechanisms of data capture. By sonifying a largely invisible tracking technology ‘Listening Back’ critiques a lack of transparency inherent to online monitoring technologies and the broader context of opt in / default cultures intrinsic to contemporary modes of online connectivity. By providing a sonic experiential platform for the real-time activity of Internet cookies this project engages listening as a mode of examination and asks what is the potential of sound as a tool for transparent questioning?

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Listening Back Browser Add-On Tranlates Cookies Into Sound: The Sound of Surveillance


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Das Umweltbundesamt hat in 2012 mit der Forschung der Umweltrelevanz von Software begonnen. Ziel der Forschung war es, die gegenseitige Beeinflussung von Hard- und Software zu erfassen, zu bewerten und geeignete Maßnahmen zu entwickeln, die es ermöglichen, die Inanspruchnahme von natürlichen Ressourcen durch Software zu reduzieren. Im Vortrag wollen Marina Köhn (Umweltbundesamt) und Dr. Eva Kern (Umwelt-Campus Birkenfeld) die Messergebnisse aus dem Labor der Forschung präsentieren und die entwickelte Methode des Forschungsprojektes erläutern. Weiterhin möchten wir die Inhalte des geplanten Umweltzeichens für Software vorstellen. Das Zusammenwirken von Hard- und Software, also zum Beispiel von Computer und Betriebssystem, ist vergleichbar mit einem Buch und dem Inhalt des Buches. Fehlt ein Teil dieser Einheit, ist der Bestimmungszweck nicht mehr gegeben. Ein Computer ist zusammengesetzt aus verschiedenen Komponenten, die unterschiedliche Aufgaben wahrnehmen. Die Software ist die Logik, die das Ausführen dieser Aufgaben ermöglicht. Zwar ist Software, ähnlich wie Wissen, immateriell, jedoch benötigt sie die Hardwareressourcen, um existieren zu können. Softwareprodukte sind somit ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik (IKT). In den letzten Jahren wurden einige Anstrengungen unternommen, um die IKT nachhaltiger zu gestalten. Beispielsweise wurden die Energieeffizienz der IKT-Produkte gesteigert, Anforderungen an das Energiemanagement der Geräte gestellt und neue ressourcenschonende Hardwarearchitekturen entwickelt. Konkrete Anforderungen an das Design und die Programmierung von Soft-ware, die die Energieeffizienz der Hardware unterstützen, sind bisher nicht vorhanden. Obwohl Hardware und Software, wie oben erläutert, eine Einheit bilden und die Art und Weise der Softwarearchitektur und -programmierung große Auswirkung auf den entsprechenden Hardwarebedarf haben, fehlen konkrete Anforderungen. Das Fehlen der Anforderungen an Softwareprodukten hat zur Folge, dass die Energieeffizienzgewinne der Hardware durch ineffiziente Software oder schlechte Softwarekonzepte nicht oder nur teilweise zum Tragen kommen. Vor diesem Hintergrund hat das Umweltbundesamt in 2012 mit der Forschung der Umweltrelevanz von Software begonnen. Ziel der Forschung war es, die gegenseitige Beeinflussung von Hard- und Software zu erfassen, zu bewerten und geeignete Maßnahmen zu entwickeln, die es ermöglichen, die Inanspruchnahme von natürlichen Ressourcen durch Software zu reduzieren. Im Forschungsprojekt „Entwicklung und Anwendung von Bewertungsgrundlagen für ressourceneffiziente Software unter Berücksichtigung bestehender Methodik“ des Umweltbundesamtes (UBA 2018) wurde zusammen mit dem Öko-Institut, den Umwelt-Campus Birkenfeld und der ETH Zürich eine Bewertungsmethodik entwickelt, anhand derer der Energiebedarf, die Inanspruchnahme von Hardware-Ressourcen sowie weitere umweltbezogene Eigenschaften von Softwareprodukten ermittelt werden können. Der Vergleich verschiedener Softwareprodukte mit gleicher Funktionalität macht deutlich, dass es teils erhebliche Unterschiede zwischen den Produkten gibt. Bei der Ausführung eines Standardnutzungsszenario werden die Unterschiede der Energieeffizienz zwischen den Softwareprodukten erkennbar. Dies ist vor allem vor dem Hintergrund relevant, dass die übermäßige Beanspruchung von Hardware dazu führt, dass die Pro-grammausführung länger dauert und es im schlimmsten Fall dazu führt, dass diese vermeintlich langsame Hardware ausgemustert und durch neue, schnellere Hardware ersetzen wird. Labels und Zertifizierungen, wie es sie seit langem schon für den Bereich der Hardware existieren, gibt es im Softwarebereich jedoch nicht. Das ändert sich demnächst! Wir haben erfolgreich Kriterien für das Umweltzeichen Blauer Engel für energie- und ressourcensparende Software entwickelt. Wir hoffen, dass wir mit dem Umweltzeichen eine Debatte über umweltverträgliche Software auslösen werden und wir hoffen, dass viele Software-Entwickler*innen und Hersteller von Software sich zukünftig an diese Kriterien orientieren.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Wie klimafreundlich ist Software?: Einblicke in die Forschung und Ausblick in die Umweltzertifizierung!


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: PDF is the most widely used standard for office documents. Supported by many desktop applications, email gateways and web services solutions, are used in all sectors, including government, business and private fields. For protecting sensitive information, PDFs can be encrypted and digitally signed. Assumed to be secure for 15 years, our talk reveals how to break PDF Encryption and how to break PDF Signatures. We elaborated novel attacks leading to critical vulnerabilities in all PDF viewers, most notably in Adobe, Foxit, and Okular. As a result, an attacker can retrieve the plaintext of encrypted PDFs without knowing the password and manipulate the content of digitally signed PDFs arbitrarily while a victim is unable to detect this. The Portable Document Format (PDF) is the de-facto standard for document exchange worldwide. It is used to store sensitive information like contracts and health records. To protect this information PDF documents can be encrypted or digitally signed. Thus, confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation can be achieved. In our research, we show that none of the PDF viewers achieve all of these goals by allowing an attacker to read encrypted content without the password or to stealthily modify the signed content. We analyze the PDF encryption specification and show two novel techniques for breaking the confidentiality of encrypted documents. First, we abuse the PDF feature of partially encrypted documents to wrap the encrypted part of the document within attacker-controlled content and therefore, exfiltrate the plaintext once the document is opened by a legitimate user. Second, we abuse a flaw in the PDF encryption specification to arbitrarily manipulate encrypted content. The only requirement is that a single block of known plaintext is needed, and we show that this is fulfilled by design. Our attacks allow the recovery of the entire plaintext of encrypted documents by using exfiltration channels which are based on standard compliant PDF properties. In addition, we present the first comprehensive security evaluation on digital signatures in PDFs. We introduce three novel attack classes which bypass the cryptographic protection of digitally signed PDF files allowing an attacker to spoof the content of a signed PDF. We analyzed 22 different PDF viewers and found 21 of them to be vulnerable, including prominent and widely used applications such as Adobe Reader DC and Foxit. We additionally evaluated eight online validation services and found six to be vulnerable.

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name: How to Break PDFs: Breaking PDF Encryption and PDF Signatures


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Für Sinti*zze und Roma*nja gehören Anfeindungen zum Alltag. Auch bei Ermittlungsbehörden stehen sie unter Generalverdacht: Es steht zu befürchten, dass die Polizei in unterschiedlichen Bundesländern rechtswidrig Daten zu ethnischer Herkunft erhebt und veröffentlicht. Warum ist es so gefährlich, ethnische Herkunft in Polizeidatenbanken zu erfassen? Und was für Konsequenzen hat es, sie in Berichterstattung zu erwähnen? Wann darf die Polizei überhaupt Daten zu ethnischer Herkunft erheben? Und wann und mit welchen Methoden tut sie es vielleicht trotz Verbots? Für Sinti*zze und Roma*nja gehören auch in Deutschland Anfeindungen in allen Lebenslagen zum Alltag. Auch bei Ermittlungsbehörden stehen sie unter Generalverdacht: Es steht zu befürchten, dass die Polizei in unterschiedlichen Bundesländern rechtswidrig Daten zu ethnischer Herkunft erhebt und veröffentlicht. In Pressemitteilungen der Polizei tauchen immer wieder Hinweise auf die ethnische Herkunft auf, vor allem bei Tatverdächtigen, seltener bei Opfern oder Zeug*innen. Die Berliner Polizei hat in der Kriminalstatistik 2017 den Hinweis veröffentlicht, dass die Mehrheit der Tatverdächtigen von „Trickdiebstahl in Wohnungen“ Angehörige der Volksgruppe Sinti und Roma seien: Dass es rechtswidrig ist, wenn die Polizei die zugrunde liegenden Daten tatsächlich erhebt, ist unstreitig. In Kooperation mit dem Zentralrat hat die Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte e.V. (GFF) im Fall der Berliner Polizeikriminalstatistik bei der Berliner Landesdatenschutzbeauftragten ein Beschwerdeverfahren wegen des Verdachts auf Diskriminierung von Sinti*zze und Roma*nja lanciert. Beide Organisationen prüfen gemeinsam weitere rechtliche Möglichkeiten. Warum ist es so gefährlich, ethnische Herkunft in Polizeidatenbanken zu erfassen? Und was für Konsequenzen hat es, sie in Berichterstattung zu erwähnen? Wann darf die Polizei überhaupt Daten zu ethnischer Herkunft erheben? Und wann tut sie es vielleicht trotz Verbots? Und mit welchen Methoden erhebt die Polizei überhaupt die ethnische Herkunft? Die Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte e.V. (GFF) und der Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma wollen diese Fragen gemeinsam mit dem Publikum diskutieren. Anja Reuss ist Politische Referentin des Zentralrats Deutscher Sinti und Roma, der politischen Interessenvertretung der deutschen Sinti und Roma mit Sitz in Heidelberg. Als Dachverband setzt sich der Zentralrat auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene für eine gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Sinti und Roma in Politik und Gesellschaft sowie für die Auseinandersetzung mit und Bekämpfung von Antiziganismus ein. Lea Beckmann ist Juristin und Verfahrenskoordinatorin der Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte e.V. (GFF). Die GFF ist eine NGO, die durch strategische Prozesse Grund- und Menschenrechte stärkt und zivilgesellschaftlichen Partnerorganisationen rechtlich unterstützt. In ihren Verfahren setzt sich die GFF dabei immer wieder kritisch mit polizeilichen Ermittlungsbefugnissen auseinander, sei dies im Zusammenhang mit dem Einsatz von Späh-Software oder bei der Datenerhebung.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Polizei-Datenbanken und Minderheiten: Staatliche Stigmatisierung und Diskriminierung von Sinti und Roma


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Ruckus Networks is a company selling wired and wireless networking equipment and software. This talk presents vulnerability research conducted on Ruckus access points and WiFi controllers, which resulted in 3 different pre-authentication remote code execution. Exploitation used various vulnerabilities such as information leak, authentication bypass, command injection, path traversal, stack overflow, and arbitrary file read/write. Throughout the research, 33 different access points firmware examined, and all of them were found vulnerable. This talk also introduces and shares the framework used in this research. That includes a Ghidra script and a dockerized QEMU full system emulation for easy cross-architecture research setup. Here's a fun fact: BlackHat USA 2019 used Ruckus Networks access points. Presentation Outline: This talk demonstrates 3 remote code executions and the techniques used to find and exploit them. It overviews Ruckus equipment and their attack surfaces. Explain the firmware analysis and emulation prosses using our dockerized QEMU full system framework. -Demonstrate the first RCE and its specifics. Describe the webserver logic using Ghidra decompiler and its scripting environment. -Demonstrate the second RCE using stack overflow vulnerability. -Lastly, demonstrate the third RCE by using a vulnerability chaining technique. All Tools used in this research will be published.

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name: Don't Ruck Us Too Hard - Owning Ruckus AP Devices: 3 different RCE vulnerabilities on Ruckus Wireless access points devices.


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Quantum technologies are often only over-hyped showed as threat for cybersecurity … But they also offer some opportunities to enhance the cybersecurity landscape . As an example, you may know that a quantum computer will be able to break RSA keys but Quantum communication technologies can also provide a new way to exchange securely a cipher key. More, with Quantum networking technologies, communication eavesdropping are , by design, detectable and thus this could lead to some good opportunities to use them to enhance cybersecurity. Some even begins to build a Quantum internet ! We may also solve main security issues face by cloud computation (privacy, confidentiality etc) via the use of "Blind quantum computation" in the cloud. However few people understand & explain how such machines & technologies work. Even fewer people trying to build one. I’m one of this crazy people. In this talk, we aim to explain how this new type of much powerful digital processing works and how we build our own Quantum computer …without a Phd in quantum physic. We will describe our plan to build the Quantum computer's hardware with hacker’s style. Through our own experiments, we will discuss our failures, our success, our progress around this challenging goal ! Come to see part of the hardware we build at the moment. We use the "Trapped ion technology". We trap atoms to make powerful calculation & computing task! Be prepared to unlock your quantum brain as this new domain is really different for classical computation ;-) but it can enhance the Cybersecurity world Our goal : Bring the knowledge that Quantum computing works, explain how they make such power calculation at hardware level, is doable at home and will provide a new way to do secure computing and communication for the best of the humanity Proposal Agenda -Quantum computer 101 (one slide to be able to understand the basic of quantum mechanic w/o FUD) -Why those Quantum computer are so powerful -How to break things with quantum computers -How to improve the security level of modern network with quantum technologies (Networking, blind quantum computing for 100%privacy in the cloud, cipher key security, quantum internet & more) -How a Quantum computer based on Trapped ions technology works to do their magic super powerful calculation (at hardware level) -How we build our own quantum computer hardware at home (in our military grade High Tech...Garage!) with hacker style & open source software (Contain full video of the buildings of our Quantum computer)

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Build you own Quantum Computer @ Home - 99% of discount - Hacker Style !


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Development-fused iPhones with hardware debugging features like JTAG are out of reach for many security researchers. This talk takes you along my journey to create a similar capability using off-the-shelf iPhones. We'll look at a way to break KTRR, a custom hardware mitigation Apple developed to prevent kernel patches, and use this capability to load a kernel extension that enables full-featured, single-step kernel debugging with LLDB on production iPhones. This talk walks through the discovery of hardware debug registers on the iPhone X that enable low-level debugging of a CPU core at any time during its operation. By single-stepping execution of the reset vector, we can modify register state at key points to disable KTRR and remap the kernel as writable. I'll then describe how I used this capability to develop an iOS kext loader and a kernel extension called KTRW that can be used to debug the kernel with LLDB over USB.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: KTRW: The journey to build a debuggable iPhone


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: As Long-Term Evolution (LTE) communication is based on over-the-air signaling, a legitimate signal can potentially be counterfeited by a malicious signal. Although most LTE signaling messages are protected from modification using cryptographic primitives, broadcast messages and some of the unicast messages are unprotected. In this talk, we would like to introduce a signal injection attack that exploits the fundamental weakness of unprotected messages in LTE and modifies a transmitted signal over the air. This attack, which is referred to as signal overshadowing (named SigOver) overwrites a portion of the legitimate signal to inject manipulated signal into the victim while the victim is connected to a legitimate cellular network. In most aspects, SigOver attack is superior to FBS (Fake Bas Station) and MitM (Man-in-the-Middle) attack, in terms of Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Stealthiness. Thus, Sigover results in new attacks exploiting broadcast channel and unicast channel. For example, SigOver attack on the broadcast messages can affect a large number of nearby UEs simultaneously such as signaling storm, Denial-Of-Service, downgrading attack, location tracking, and fake emergency alert. SigOver attack on unicast channel can silently hand over victims to FBS and perform MitM attack. Sigover attack is currently zero-day. Since it exploits the fundamental problems in LTE physical signal, it will remain effective until 3GPP standards change. In detail, we talk about the implementation of the SigOver, the first practical realization of the signal overshadowing attack on the LTE broadcast signals, using a low-cost Software Defined Radio (SDR) platform and open-source LTE library. The SigOver attack was tested against 10 smartphones connected to a real-world network, and all were successful. The experimental result shows that the SigOver overshadows the target signal and causes the victim device to decode it with 98% success rate with only 3 dB power difference from a legitimate signal. On the other hand, attacks utilizing an FBS have only 80% success rate even with 35 dB power difference. This implies that the SigOver can inconspicuously inject any LTE message and hand over victims to FBS for the Man-in-the-Middle attack. Presentation Snapshot : 1. Overview on LTE Architecture including structure, security aspects, and types of messages. Broadcast messages and some of the unicast messages are unprotected; thus they have a fundamental weakness. 2. Introduction of SigOver Attack, attack vectors, detailed implementational design, and issues on performing the attack. SigOver attack can manipulate unprotected LTE signals. 3. Comparison with FBS (Fake Base Station) Attacker and MitM (Man-in-the-Middle) Attacker, in terms of Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Stealthiness. In most aspects, SigOver is superior than FBS and MitM attacker. 4. Possible exploitations of broadcast channel using SigOver Attacks, such as signaling storm, Denial-Of-Service, downgrading attack, location tracking, and fake emergency alert. 5. Possible exploitations of unicast channel using SigOver Attacks. An attacker can manipulate every individual unprotected downlink messages. As the whole injection process is silent, this results in whole new types of attacks. 6. For example, an attacker can silently hand over victims to the fake base station. Once the victim is connected to the FBS, attacks including Man-in-the-Middle attack are possible.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: SigOver + alpha: Signal overshadowing attack on LTE and its applications


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Civil society depends on the continuing ability of citizens to communicate with one another, without fear of interference, deprivation or eavesdropping. As the international political climate changes alongside that of our physical climatic environment, we must find ways to create mobile communications systems that are truly resilient and sustainable in the face of such shocks. We have therefore identified a number of freedoms that are required for resilient mobile phones: Energy, Communications, Security, Innovation, Maintenance and Scale-Dependency. These can be summarised as making it possible for people to create, maintain and develop mobile communications solutions, without requiring the capital and resources of a large company to do so. In this lecture I will explain why each of these is necessary, as well as describing how we are incorporating these principles into the MEGAphone open, resilient and secure smart-phone project. In the humanitiarian sector we talk about how without energy there is no communications, and without communications there is no organisation, and how without organisation people die. As we see increasing frequency of natural disasters, man-made disasters like wars and unrest, and the distressing intersection of these events, we have been convinced that we need to be able to create mobile communications devices that can not only survive in such events, but be sustained in the long term, and into what we call the coming Digital Winter. The Digital Winter is the situation where the freedoms to create and innovation digital systems will become impossible or highly limited due to any of various interrelated factors, such as further movement towards totalitarian governments, the failure of international supply systems (or their becoming so untrustworthy to be usable), the failure of various forms of critical infrastructure and so on. Fortunately the Digital Winter has not yet arrived, but the signs of the Digital Autumn are already upon us: The cold winds chilling our personal freedoms can already be felt in various places. Thus we have the imperative to act now, while the fruit of summer and autumn still hangs on the trees, so that we can make a harvest that will in the least sustain us through the Digital Winter with resilient, secure and sustainable communications systems, and hopefully either stave off the onset of the winter, bring it to a sooner end, and/or make the winter less bitter and destructive for the common person. It is in this context that we have begun thinking about what is necessary to achieve this, and have identified six freedoms that are required to not merely create digital solutions that can survive the Digital Winter, but hopefully allow such solutions to continue to be developed during the Digital Winter, so that we can continue to react to the storms that will come and the predators that will seek to devour our freedoms like hungry wolves. The six freedoms are: 1. Freedom from Energy Infrastructure, so that we cannot be deprived of the energy we need to communicate. 2. Freedom from Communications Infrastructure, so that we cannot be deprived of the communications we need to organise and sustain communities. 3. Freedom from depending on vendors for the security of our devices, so that we can patch security problems promptly as they emerge, so that we can sustain communications and privacy. 4. Freedom to continue to innovate and improve our digital artefacts and systems, so that we can react to emergy threats and opportunities. 5. Freedom to maintain our devices, both their hardware and software, so that our ability to communicate and organise our communities cannot be easily eroded by the passage of time. 6. Freedom from Scale-Dependency, so that individuals and small groups can fully enjoy the ability to communicate and exercise the preceding freedoms, without relying on large corporations and capital, and also allowing minimising of environmental impact. In this lecture I will explore these issues, as well as describe how we are putting them into practice to create truly resilient and sustainable mobile phones and similar devices, including in the MEGAphone open-source/open-hardware smart phone.

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name: Creating Resilient and Sustainable Mobile Phones: Be prepared for the coming Digital Winter. And play Impossible Mission.


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The 3DS is reaching end of life but has not revealed all its weaknesses yet. This talk will go through the process of reverse engineering an undocumented communication protocol and show how assessing hard-to-reach features yields dangerous results, including remote code execution exploits! Embedded Devices are all around us, talking to each other in ways we often don't even realize. In this talk, we discuss how one such communication mechanism in the 3DS remained unexplored for over seven years as well as the vulnerabilities that were lying dormant as a result. We will explore specific features of the 3DS and talk about their low-level implementation details and about why they were not tested before. Besides, we will walk through the (lengthy) dev process involved in putting together this exploit, and the significant risks involved in devices (even game consoles) having this kind of vulnerability. Finally, we will demonstrate the attack in action. Since the talk will be a bit technical some basic knowledge about network protocols and software exploitation techniques is recommended, but it is aimed to be enjoyable for non-technical audiences as well. One might also take a look at previous talks (32c3 and 33c3) about the 3ds for more in-depth background knowledge.

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name: It's not safe on the streets... especially for your 3DS!: Exploring a new attack surface on the 3DS


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The Next Generation Internet initiative is the first concerted effort in Europe to put significant public funding to hands-on work to really fix the internet. The long term vision of the initiative is to make the internet what we need and expected it to be in the first place: Resilient. Trustworthy. Sustainable. The concrete mission of the Next Generation Internet initiative is to "re-imagine and re-engineer the Internet for the third millennium and beyond". With new projects starting all the time, the density of awesome open source, open hardware, new science and new standards in-the-making is already intense: about 200 projects are currently on their way. These range from encrypted synchronisation for calendars and address books to symbolical protocol verification, from an open hardware RISC-V SoC to removing binary seeds from operating systems, from ethical search to the Fediverse etc. NGI Zero offers funding to independent researchers and FOSS developers working on free and open projects in the area of privacy and trust enhancing technologies and on search, discovery and discoverability. It also offers an elaborate 'pipeline' of supporting activities that live up to high standards (sometimes called 'walk the talk') in terms of security, privacy, accessibility, open source licensing, standardisation, packaging, etc. The talk will provide an overview of the awesome R&D that is now in the pipeline, how the programme is organised and everything you need to know about the various opportunities to 'come and work for the internet'. NGI Zero Discovery and NGI Zero PET are a significant effort and ambitious effort by a large group of organisations led by NLnet foundation (that was instrumental in pioneering the early internet in Europe): Accessibility Foundation - Center of expertise on accessibility of internet and other digital media for all people, including the elderly and people with disabilities Association for Progressive Communications - A global network and organisation that strives towards easy and affordable access to a free and open internet to improve the lives of people and create a more just world Center for the Cultivation of Technology - A charitable non-profit host organization for international Free Software projects Commons Caretakers - A not-for-profit service provider for the development of Commons Network Security Group of Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich - Academic research institute focused on building secure and robust network systems Free Software Foundation Europe - Association charity that aims to empower users to control technology. ifrOSS - Provides not-for-profit legal services and studies in the context of free and open source software NixOS Foundation - Foundation supporting development and use of purely functional configuration management tools, in particular NixOS and related projects NLnet Foundation (NL) - Grantmaking public benefit organisation founded by pioneers of the early European internet Petites Singularités - Non profit organisation working with free sofware and focusing on collective practices Radically Open Security - Not-for-profit open source security company TIMIT - Experts in secure software Translate House - Develops and implements open source localization solutions The budget for the effort is kindly provided by the European Commission.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: NGI Zero: A treasure trove of IT innovation: Resilient. Trustworthy. Sustainably Open.


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Wir machen Standardzellen für LibreSilicon verfügbar, welche Open Source und nutzbar sind. Wir möchten darüber sprechen und vorführen, was wir tun. LibreSilicon entwickelt eine freie und offene Technologie um Siliziumchips herstellen zu können. Dies umfasst alle notwendigen Informationen dies zu tun, oder technisch gesagt, ein Process Design Kit (PDK - engl: Prozessbauskasten). Die Anwender nutzen überwiegend auf einer Abstraktionsebene höher mit ihren Design Compiler meist jedoch die Standardzellenbibliothek (StdCellLib) mit Basisblöcken wie Logikgattern, Latches, FlipFlops, Speicherzellen oder auch Padzellen. Aus Sicht eines Programmierers wäre das PDK vergleichbar einer Sprachdefinition wie C, die darauf aufsetzende Standardzellbibliothek (StdCellLib) dann vergleichbar mit der libc. Nun enthalten alle nur kommerziell verfügbaren Standardzellenbibliotheken lediglich eine kleine Teilmenge aller nützlichen Zellen, limitiert durch die Arbeitskräfte beim Hersteller. Sie sind handgemacht und fehlerträchtig. Unglücklicherweise sind die kommerziellen Standardzellbibliotheken stark vom PDK abhängig und mit Geheimhaltungsvereinbarungen gepflastert. Unser Ziel ist es, die erste freie und offene Standardzellbibliothek zu werden. Dieser Talk zeigt, wie weit wir bereits gekommen sind, mit Hilfe der Makefile-gesteuerten Lösung eine beachtliche Anzahl an Standardzellen und deren Ausgabeformate als Abhängigkeiten automatisiert zu generieren.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: LibreSilicon's Standard Cell Library (de): show + tell


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Die sogenannten digitalen Assistenzsysteme des BAMF, „intelligente Grenzen“ in der EU und immer größer werdende Datenbanken: Wer ins Land kommt und bleiben darf, wird immer mehr von IT-Systemen bestimmt. Davon profitiert die Überwachungsindustrie, während Menschen von automatisierten Entscheidungen abhängig werden. Deutschland hat in den letzten Jahren massiv in Technik investiert, um Asylverfahren zu digitalisieren. Biometrische Bilder mit Datenbanken abgleichen, Handys ausgelesen und analysieren, Sprache durch automatische Erkennungssysteme schleifen. Ganz abgesehen von der Blockchain, die alles noch besser machen soll. Doch nicht nur in Deutschland werden zum Zweck der Migrationskontrollen immer mehr Daten genutzt. In Norwegen werden Facebook-Profile Geflüchteter ausgewertet, in Dänemark sogar USB-Armbänder. Die Grenzagentur Frontex soll für „intelligente Grenzen“ sorgen, Datenbanken werden EU-weit ausgebaut und zusammengelegt. Rechtschutzmechanismen versagen größtenteils. Worum es dabei geht? Schnellere Abschiebungen. Wer davon profitiert? Die Überwachungsindustrie. In Vorbereitung von Klageverfahren bringt die Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte e.V. (GFF) gemeinsam mit der Journalistin Anna Biselli im Laufe des Dezembers eine Studie heraus, die sich diesem Thema genauer widmet. Die Ergebnisse der Studie wollen Lea Beckmann und Anna Biselli gemeinsam vorstellen und kontextualisieren. Anna Biselli ist Informatikerin und Journalistin und arbeitet seit Jahren zu Fragen der Digitalisierung von Migrationskontrolle. Lea Beckmann ist Juristin und Verfahrenskoordinatorin der Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte e.V. (GFF). Die GFF ist eine NGO, die durch strategische Gerichtsverfahren Grund- und Menschenrechte stärkt und zivilgesellschaftliche Partnerorganisationen rechtlich unterstützt. In vielen ihrer Verfahren setzt sich die GFF dabei für Datenschutz und einen verantwortungsvollen Einsatz von Technologie und gegen Diskriminierung ein.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Digitalisierte Migrationskontrolle: Von Handyauswertung, intelligenten Grenzen und Datentöpfen


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Festivals and events are organized by a small group of deciders. But what would Eris do? (chaos!) We will look at some of our experiences with decentralised festivals where every participant can truly participate, reflect on how they influence our way of discussing and producing art and technology and discuss p2panda, an idea of a p2p protocol for (self-)organising resources, places and events, which is based on the SSB protocol. This is a technical, artistic, theoretical reflection on how we use technology to run and experiment with decentralised festivals. VERANTWORTUNG 3000 (2016), HOFFNUNG 3000 (2017) and now p2panda are platforms and protocols to setup groups, festivals, gatherings, events or spaces in a decentralised, self-organised manner which allow us to raise questions on how we organise ourselves in our social, artistic & theoretical communities. In this presentation we want to: Show work and reflection processes of BLATT 3000 and Liebe Chaos Verein e. V. i. G. in Berlin on how technology informs art production and how these systemic "meta"-questions can be made the actual means of art, theory and discussion. Introduce some technical key-concepts of the p2panda protocol and how offline-first, append-only data-types, user authorization through cryptographic keys are interesting for ephemerality, self-organization, non-individuality, decentralization and anonymity in art and theory production. Present fictional ideas for festivals of the future. Talk about pandas.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: p2panda: Social, artistic & theoretical experiments with decentralized festivals


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: In Brüssel wird über eine Verordnung verhandelt, die es allen EU-Staaten ermöglichen soll, Provider zur Herausgabe von Inhalten oder Metadaten zu verpflichten – egal wo die Daten gespeichert sind, egal ob die Tat, um die es geht, dort eine Straftat ist. Werden CLOUD-Act, e-Evidence und ähnliche Kodifikationen bald dafür sorgen, dass Strafverfolgungsbehörden aller Länder Daten von Providern weltweit abgreifen können? Strafverfolger hierzulande würden gern möglichst schnell alle möglichen Daten von allen möglichen Online-Diensten über ihre Kunden erhalten. Juristisch stehen dem bisher einige Hürden im Weg, wenn die Anbieter nicht im Inland sitzen oder wenn sie Daten auf Servern im Ausland speichern. Hinter der Auskunft, mit welcher IP eine Morddrohung auf Facebook gepostet wurde, verbergen sich Diskussionen über die großen Themen des Völkerrechts: Souveränität und Territorialität. Weil Daten oft auf der ganzen Welt gespeichert werden, wird das etablierte System der gegenseitigen Rechtshilfe in Frage gestellt. Während die EU noch über die eEvidence-Verordnung berät, haben die USA schon mit UK ein Abkommen für unbegrenzten Direktzugriff geschlossen und verhandeln mit Australien. Warum diesen neuen Regeln jeder Grundrechtsschutz fehlt und wie grenzüberschreitende Repression politische Verfolgung verändern könnte, erfahrt ihr in diesem Talk.

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name: Die Zukunft grenzüberschreitenden Datenzugriffs und politischer Verfolgung


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) is the biggest particle accelerator on Earth. It was built to study matter in more detail than ever before and prove physical theories like the Standard Model of Particle Physics. This talk will focus on the engineering aspects of LHC. How was it built? What makes it tick? Which technologies are needed to create a such powerful machine? This talk will take you on a journey to explore how the most complex machine ever built by humans works. During previous CCCs, several talks described what kind of data the experiments of LHC look out for, how the data is stored, how physicists are analysing data and how they extract their huge discoveries. Often times though, the presence of the particle accelerator itself is taken for granted in light of these findings. That's why this talk will give an in-depth engineering summary about that 'particle accelerator'. We'll shed light on the big technology and engineering problems that had to be solved before being able to build a machine that we take for granted these days. Among other things, we will describe how to cool down several thousand tons of magnets to -271.25°C, how to safely dissipate ~500 MegaJoule of energy in just a fraction of a second, or how to bend a beam of particles around a corner while it's moving along with ~99,9999991% of the speed of light. Of course, we'll also touch on the bits that make collecting the data gathered in all the physics detectors possible in the first place.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: The Large Hadron Collider Infrastructure Talk


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The ZombieLoad attack exploits a vulnerability of most Intel CPUs, which allows leaking data currently processed by other programs. ZombieLoad is extremely powerful, as it leaks data from user-processes, the kernel, secure enclaves, and even across virtual machines. Moreover, ZombieLoad also works on CPUs where Meltdown is fixed in software or hardware. The Meltdown attack published in 2018 was a hardware vulnerability which showed that the security guarantees of modern CPUs do not always hold. Meltdown allowed attackers to leak arbitrary memory by exploiting the lazy fault handling of Intel CPUs which continue transient execution with data received from faulting loads. With software mitigations, such as stronger kernel isolation, as well as new CPUs with this vulnerability fixed, Meltdown seemed to be solved. In this talk, we show that this is not true, and Meltdown is still an issue on modern CPUs. We present ZombieLoad, an attack closely related to the original Meltdown attack, which leaks data across multiple privilege boundaries: processes, kernel, SGX, hyperthreads, and even across virtual machines. Furthermore, we compare ZombieLoad to other microarchitectural data-sampling (MDS) attacks, such as Fallout and RIDL. The ZombieLoad attack can be mounted from any unprivileged application, without user interactions, both on Linux and Windows. In the talk, we present multiple attacks, such as monitoring the browsing behavior, stealing cryptographic keys, and leaking the root-password hash on Linux. In a live demo, we demonstrate that such attacks are not only feasible but also relatively easy to mount, and difficult to mitigate. We show that Meltdown mitigations do not affect ZombieLoad, and consequently outline challenges for future research on Meltdown attacks and mitigations. Finally, we discuss the short-term and long-term implications of Meltdown attacks for hardware vendors, software vendors, and users.

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name: ZombieLoad Attack: Leaking Your Recent Memory Operations on Intel CPUs


Extinction Rebellion

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Extinction Rebellion (XR) ist eine global agierende, schnell wachsende, klimaaktivistische Graswurzel-Bewegung, die mit gewaltfreien Aktionen zivilen Ungehorsams auf die drohende Klimakatastrophe hinweist und Regierungen zum Handeln bewegen will. Die Ortsgruppe Berlin präsentiert in einer Art Jahresrückblick eine Auswahl an aktuellen Aktionen und stellt vor, wo wir als Bewegung gerade stehen, was wir bislang erreicht haben und was weiterhin gebraucht wird, um ein dringend notwendiges politisches Umsteuern einzuleiten. Let's act now. Extinction Rebellion (XR) hat ein turbulentes erstes Jahr hinter sich. Im letzten Herbst wurden in London die fünf wichtigsten Brücken über die Themse besetzt und die drohende Klimakatastrophe begann – endlich! – ins öffentliche Bewusstsein zu rücken. In diesem Herbst gab es koordinierte Aktionen und Blockaden mit Zehntausenden Teilnehmer:innen bereits in über 60 Metropolen auf der ganzen Welt. Über zweitausend Menschen sind dabei verhaftetet worden. Klimapolitisch hat sich dennoch so gut wie nichts getan. Während Regierungen entweder regungslos verharren oder aber den Klimanotstand ausrufen und zugleich neue Infrastruktur für fossile Brennstoffe bewilligen, arbeitet die Leugner:innenmaschinerie auf Hochtouren und bemüht sich um die Konstruktion alternativer Fakten. Gleichzeitig erleben wir immer wieder, dass unsere wissenschaftlichen Prognosen nicht stimmen und sich der Klimawandel in seinem Verlauf schneller und heftiger vollzieht als vorhergesagt. Hitzewellen, Waldbrände, Dürren, Ernteausfälle, Wasserknappheit sind nicht mehr zu ignorieren. Es ist daher unumgänglich, den politischen Druck zu erhöhen, indem mehr Aktionen an mehr Orten mit noch viel mehr Menschen und auf vielen verschiedenen Ebenen durchgeführt werden. XR kann jede Art von Unterstützung gut gebrauchen – egal ob es um Nachhilfe in puncto Privacy geht, um Operational Security, um Soft- und Hardware oder um eigenständigen Hacktivismus. Wichtig ist nur: Wir müssen uns jetzt aufraffen, zusammentun und aktiv werden. The time is now.

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SIM card technology from A-Z

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Billions of subscribers use SIM cards in their phones. Yet, outside a relatively small circle, information about SIM card technology is not widely known. This talk aims to be an in-depth technical overview. Today, billions of subscribers use SIM cards in their phones. Yet, outside a relatively small circle, information about SIM card technology is not widely known. If at all, people know that once upon a time, they were storing phone books on SIM cards. Every so often there are some IT security news about SIM card vulnerabilities, and SIM card based attacks on subscribers. Let's have a look at SIM card technology during the past almost 30 years and cover topics like Quick intro to ISO7816 smart cards SIM card hardware, operating system, applications SIM card related specification bodies, industry, processes from SIM to UICC, USIM, ISIM and more SIM toolkit, proactive SIM eSIM

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uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Forget look-alike domains, typosquatting and homograph attacks. In this talk we will discuss ways of forging perfect email counterfeits that (as far as recipients can tell) appear to be coming from well-known domain and successfully pass all checks on their way. Prime focus of this talk will be modern anti-spoofing strategies and the ways around them. Join us as we try to figure out answers to questions such as "Isn't SPF enough?", "Do I *really* need DMARC?" and "Does ticking all three (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) provide the best protection possible?" (answers to these questions are "no", "yes", "no" by the way). Email security is poorly covered by a contemporary penetration testing curricula. In this talk I will argue that it leads to underreporting of email-related security issues during regular penetration tests or red team assignments. Getting clicks from (at least some) users is usually fairly easy, even with obviously fake domain names and email addresses, so penetration testers rarely need to do anything more fancy in order to achieve their objective. While this highlights the need for user education, it misses common misconfiguration issues that might lead to much more devastating compromises and could instill false sense of security in (rare) cases that regular phishing attacks fail. Technically inclined users (such as developers, tech support or even SIEM analysts) are less likely than others to fall for phishing email originating from fake domain, but they are actually more likely to fall for email seemingly originating from real known-good source due to overconfidence. In this talk we will see just how easy is it to send spoofed mail from arbitrary source address due to lack of protection for this scenario in original SMTP spec. We won't stop there however and our next object of focus will be contemporary anti-spoofing technologies (SPF, DKIM and DMARC). We will discuss motivation behind them, their technical limitations, weaknesses discovered in recent years as well as common misconfigurations. Attendees will gain knowledge about relevant protocols and technologies that should be applicable for identifying weaknesses in the architecture of their own email systems.

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name: Email authentication for penetration testers: When SPF is not enough


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Seit dem 14. November ist die letzte Schonfrist zur Umsetzung der Europäischen Richtline 2015/2366 über Zahlungsdienste im Binnenmarkt (neudeutsch PSD2) verstrichen. Das hat erst vielen Banken viel Arbeit gemacht, und macht jetzt vielen Kunden viel Ärger. Warum eigentlich? Dieser Vortrag gibt einen Überblick über die Hintergründe der Zahlungsdiensterichtlinie, das was sie bewirken sollte, und das was sie tatsächlich bewirkt. Der Sicht aus der Regulierungsperspektive wird die tatsächliche Erfahrung als Anwender, und als Entwickler von Open-Source-Software gegenübergestellt.

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name: Was hat die PSD2 je für uns getan?: Pleiten, Pech und Pannen in der Zahlungsdiensteregulierung


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Three and a half years after Europe enshrined net neutrality in law, the protections for the open internet are being renegotiated. Europe finds itself in the middle of an immense lobbying battle about the legality of internet blocking, zero-rating and the internet as a common carrier for everyone. All this while the EU is also the first world region trying to fit the next mobile network standard 5G into the net neutrality framework as we currently know it. This talk will give a brief summary about the past years of regulatory enforcement, how the internet has developed in Europe and what to expect from the ongoing reform. The Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communication (BEREC) is currently reforming the net neutrality framework of the EU. The reform started in late 2018 and will come to a conclusion in March 2020. The talk will outline the full reform process and explain the issues the digital rights community is fighting for. A particular focus will be on the challanges that the next mobile network standard 5G brings to the net neutrality debate and what to expect from new technology aspects like network slices and edge computing. Additionally, we will give insights into net neutrality enforcement throughout the European Union in the past three and a half years. This section of the talk is based on a comprehensive study which epicenter.works has conducted in 2019. The Austrian digital rights NGO epicenter.works is a leading net neutrality advocate in the EU. Their campaign www.savetheinternet.eu followed the policy debate to enshrine net neutrality in law in the European Union and lasted from 2013 until 2016. Since then, the organisation has become a public watchdog on the regulatory enforcement of the rules and published extensive legal and technical analysis on net neutrality violations. They try to shape the regulatory and public debate by speaking at annual shareholder meetings of Deutsche Telekom and participate in expert consultations from telecom regulators. With the ongoing reform, the net neutrality debate in Europe is heating up once again, with an uncertain outcome.

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name: 5G & Net Neutrality: Status of the Net Neutrality Reform in Europe


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: A deep dive investigation into Siemens S7 PLCs bootloader and ADONIS Operating System. Siemens is a leading provider of industrial automation components for critical infrastructures, and their S7 PLC series is one of the most widely used PLCs in the industry. In recent years, Siemens integrated various security measures into their PLCs. This includes, among others, firmware integrity verification at boot time using a separate bootloader code. This code is baked in a separated SPI flash, and its firmware is not accessible via Siemens' website. In this talk, we present our investigation of the code running in the Siemens S7-1200 PLC bootloader and its security implications. Specifically, we will demonstrate that this bootloader, which to the best of our knowledge was running at least on Siemens S7-1200 PLCs since 2013, contains an undocumented "special access feature". This special access feature can be activated when the user sends a specific command via UART within the first half-second of the PLC booting. The special access feature provides functionalities such as limited read and writes to memory at boot time via the UART interface. We discovered that a combination of those protocol features could be exploited to execute arbitrary code in the PLC and dump the entire PLC memory using a cold-boot style attack. With that, this feature can be used to violate the existing security ecosystem established by Siemens. On a positive note, once discovered by the asset owner, this feature can also be used for good, e.g., as a forensic interface for Siemens PLCs. The talk will be accompanied by the demo of our findings.

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name: A Deep Dive Into Unconstrained Code Execution on Siemens S7 PLCs


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The Achilles heel of [your secure device] is the secure boot chain. In this presentation we will show our results from auditing commonly used boot loaders and walk through the attack surface you open yourself up to. You would be surprised at how much attack surface exists when hardening and defense in depth is ignored. From remote attack surface via network protocol parsers to local filesystems and various BUS parsing, we will walk through the common mistakes we've seen by example and showcase how realistic it is for your product's secure boot chain to be compromised.

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name: Boot2root: Auditing Boot Loaders by Example


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Kann künstliche Intelligenz Kunst erzeugen? Können Menschen von künstlich intelligenten Systemen erzeugte Kunst verstehen? Ist Kunst ein Weg zu neuen Stufen eines kybernetischen Verstandes? Der Stand der KI-Kunst ist keine Kunst oder keine KI. Aber wir werden mit unserer menschlichen Eitelkeit konfrontiert werden, nicht die Einzigen zu sein, die schöpferisch und auch künstlerische Relevanz in Betrachtern auslösen. Dies liegt mitunter an unseren bisherigen Kunstbegriffen und -verständnissen, die oftmals mit Intentionalität assoziiert sind. Eliza: Warum? Simon Hegelich widmen sich diesen Fragen und zeigt eigene (?) Werke (Videos, Bilder, Gedichte), die mit KI erzeugt wurden, wobei er seine großen Leidenschaften;- Kunst, maschinelles Lernen, Hegelsche Dialektik, Science Fiction, Kybernetik und Transhumanismus- der Erweiterung durch Diskurs unterzieht. Künstlich intelligente Systeme werden seit den 70er Jahren zunehmend in künstlerischen Schaffensprozesse einbezogen. Ob Computer auch autonom Kunst generieren können, ist keine Frage der Leistungsfähigkeit solcher Systeme, es wirft vielmehr die Frage auf, inwieweit tradierte Kunstbegriffe neu gedacht werden können. Die Beschäftigung mit KI und Kunst birgt im Vergleich zu laufenden KI-Debatten eine Reihe zusätzlicher Denkfreiheitsgrade: Sie ist erfahrbar! Gerade weil Kunst als Konzept schwierig zu fassen ist, uns gleichzeitig Künstlerisches inspiriert, zum Spekulieren, Träumen und Empfinden anregt, lässt sich vor diesem Hintergrund ganz anders über KIs und ihre Potentiale diskutieren. Unter Einbezug des technischen Standes derzeitiger Deep Learning Systeme und der eigenen künstlerischen Erfahrung werden diese Potentiale aufgefächert. Wir stellen den Diskurs um Grundfragen zum Verhältnis Mensch-KI-Kunst neue Fragen diametral gegenüber: Kann künstliche Intelligenz Kunst erzeugen? Wie können wir Kunst von künstlich intelligenten Systemen verstehen? Kann Kunst KI erzeugen und versteht das noch jemand? Simon Hegelich (KI-Entwickler, Philosoph, Professor für Political Data Science, Videoartist und Synthinerd) widmet sich diesen Fragen in eine Präsentation und schmeißt seine großen Leidenschaften zusammen: Kunst, maschinelles Lernen, Hegelsche Dialektik, Science Fiction, Kybernetik und Transhumanismus. Es könnte explosiv werden.

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name: Mensch - Kunst – Maschine: Mit künstlicher Intelligenz zu neuer Kunst zum kybernetischen Verstand


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: This talk will cover everything about the Acorn Archimedes, a British computer first released in 1987 and (slightly) famous for being the genesis of the original ARM processor. The Archimedes was designed by Acorn in the UK in the mid-1980s, and was released in late 1987 with massive performance for its medium price (and, with the first OS, a hangover-coloured GUI). The machine isn't widely known outside Europe. Even in the UK, it was released just as the IBM PC was taking over, so remained niche. It was built from scratch with four purpose-designed chips, the ARM, the VIDC, the MEMC and the IOC. Looking at each chip, we'll take a hardware and software tour through what is one of the most influential yet little-known modern computers. The talk will detail the video, sound, IO and memory management hardware, alongside the original ARM processor which is quite different to what we have today. The Arc was a pleasure to program, both simple and fast, and we'll look at its software including the quirky operating systems that made the Arc tick, from Arthur to RISC OS and Acorn's mysterious BSD4.3 UNIX, RISCiX. The first models were followed by the lower-end A3000 in 1989, which looked similar to the the Amiga 500 or Atari STE but had around eight times the CPU performance: no sprites, no blitter, no Copper, no problem! ;-) This talk will also share insights from the original chipset designers, with a tour of prototype hardware and unreleased Archimedes models. The audience will get an appreciation for the Arc's elegant design, the mid-1980s birth of RISC processors, and the humble origins of the now-omnipresent ARM architecture.

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name: The Ultimate Acorn Archimedes talk: Everything about the Archimedes computer (with zero 'Eureka!' jokes)


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: SQLite is one of the most deployed software in the world. However, from a security perspective, it has only been examined through the narrow lens of WebSQL and browser exploitation. We believe that this is just the tip of the iceberg. In our long term research, we experimented with the exploitation of memory corruption issues within SQLite without relying on any environment other than the SQL language. Using our innovative techniques of Query Hijacking and Query Oriented Programming, we proved it is possible to reliably exploit memory corruptions issues in the SQLite engine. We demonstrate these techniques a couple of real-world scenarios: pwning a password stealer backend server, and achieving iOS persistency with higher privileges. Everyone knows that databases are the crown jewels from a hacker's point of view, but what if you could use a database as the hacking tool itself? We discovered that simply querying a malicious SQLite database - can lead to Remote Code Execution. We used undocumented SQLite3 behavior and memory corruption vulnerabilities to take advantage of the assumption that querying a database is safe. How? We created a rogue SQLite database that exploits the software used to open it.Exploring only a few of the possibilities this presents we’ll pwn password stealer backends while they parse credentials files and achieve iOS persistency by replacing its Contacts database… The landscape is endless (Hint: Did someone say Windows 10 0-day?). This is extremely terrifying since SQLite3 is now practically built-in to any modern system. In our talk we also discuss the SQLite internals and our novel approach for abusing them. We had to invent our own ROP chain technique using nothing but SQL CREATE statements. We used JOIN statements for Heap Spray and SELECT subqueries for x64 pointer unpacking and arithmetics. It's a new world of using the familiar Structured Query Language for exploitation primitives,laying the foundations for a generic leverage of memory corruption issues in database engines.

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name: SELECT code_execution FROM * USING SQLite: --Gaining code execution using a malicious SQLite database


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Reverse engineering a system on a chip from sparse documentation and binaries, developing an emulator from it and gathering the knowledge needed to develop a replacement for one of the more controversial binary blobs in the modern PC. The Intel Management Engine, a secondary computer system embedded in modern chipsets, has long been considered a security risk because of its black-box nature and high privileges within the system. The last few years have seen increasing amounts of research into the ME and several vulnerabilities have been found. Although limited details were published about these vulnerabilities, reproducing exploits has been hard because of the limited information available on the platform. The ME firmware is the root of trust for the fTPM, Intel Boot Guard and several other platform security features, controlling it allows overriding manufacturer firmware signing, and allows implementing many background management features. I have spent most of past year reverse engineering the OS, hardware and links to the host (main CPU) system. This research has led me to create custom tools for manipulating firmware images, to write an emulator for running ME firmware modules under controlled circumstances and allowed me to replicate an unpublished exploit to gain code execution. In this talk I will share the knowledge I have gathered so far, document my methods and also explain how to go about a similar project. I also plan to discuss the possibility of an open source replacement firmware for the Management Engine. The information in this talk covers ME version 11.x, which is found in 6th and 7th generation chipsets (Skylake/Kabylake era), most of the hardware related information is also relevant for newer chipsets.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Intel Management Engine deep dive: Understanding the ME at the OS and hardware level


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: In September 2019, Privacy International released exclusive research on the data-sharing practices of menstruation apps. Using traffic analysis, we shed lights on the shady practices of companies that shared your most intimate data with Facebook and other third parties. In this talk we will go over the findings of this research, sharing the tools we have used and explaining why this is not just a privacy problem, but also a cybersecurity one. This talk will also be a call to action to app developers whose tools have concrete impact on the lives of their users. Does anyone – aside from the person you had sex with – know when you last had sex? Would you like them to know if your partner used a condom or not? Would you share the date of your last period with them? Does that person know how you feel on any particular day? Do they know about your medical history? Do they know when you masturbate? Chances are this person does not exist, as there is only so much we want to share, even with our most intimate partner. Yet this is all information that menstruation apps expect their users to fill. With all this private information you would expect those apps to uphold the highest standards when it comes to handling the data they collect. So, Privacy International set out to look at the most commonly used menstruation apps to find out if that was the case. Using traffic analysis, we wanted to see if those apps were sharing data with third parties and Facebook in particular, through the Facebook SDK. Our research shed light on the horrific practices of some menstruation apps that shared their users’ most intimate data – about their sexual life, their health and lifestyle – with Facebook and others. In this talk, we will take you through the research we have conducted by using Privacy International’s publicly available and free testing environment. We will briefly explain how the testing environment work and we will showcase the menstruation apps that have the most problematic practices to show you how very granular and intimate data is shared with third parties and security implications.

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name: No Body's Business But Mine, a dive into Menstruation Apps: The Not-So Secret Data Sharing Practices Of Menstruation Apps


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: While open source is necessary for trustable hardware, it is far from sufficient. This is because “hashing” hardware – verifying its construction down to the transistor level – is typically a destructive process, so trust in hardware is a massive time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) problem. This talk helps us understand the nature of the TOCTOU problem by providing a brief overview of the supply chain security problem and various classes of hardware implants. We then shift gears to talk about ways to potentially close the TOCTOU gap, concluding with a curated set of verifiable components that we are sharing as an open source mobile communications platform – a kind of combination hardware and software distribution – that we hope can be useful for developing and deploying all manner of open platforms that require a higher level of trust and security. The inconvenient truth is that open source hardware is precisely as trustworthy as closed source hardware. The availability of design source only enables us to agree that the designer’s intent can be trusted and is likely correct, but there is no essential link between the hardware design source and the piece of hardware on your desk. Thus while open source is necessary for trustable hardware, it is far from sufficient. This is quite opposite from the case of open source software thanks to projects like Reproducible Builds, where binaries can be loaded in-memory and cryptographically verified and independently reproduced to ensure a match to the complete and corresponding source of a particular build prior to execution, thus establishing a robust link between the executable and the source. Unfortunately, “hashing” hardware – verifying its construction down to the transistor level – is typically a destructive process, so trust in hardware is a massive time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) problem. Even if you thoroughly inspect the design source, the factory could modify the design. Even if you audit the factory, the courier delivering the hardware to your desk could insert an implant. Even if you carried the hardware from the factory to your desk, an “evil maid” could modify your machine. This creates an existential crisis for trust – how can we know our secrets are safe if the very hardware we use to compute them could be readily tainted? This talk addresses the elephant in the room by helping us understand the nature of the TOCTOU problem by providing a brief overview of the supply chain security problem and various classes of hardware implants. We then shift gears to talk about ways to potentially close the TOCTOU gap. When thinking about hardening a system against supply chain attacks, every component – from the CPU to the keyboard to the LCD – must be considered in order to defend against implanted screen grabbers and key loggers. At every level, a trade-off exists between complexity and the feasibility of non-destructive end-user verification with minimal tooling: a system simple enough to be readily verified will not have the equivalent compute power or features of a smartphone. However, we believe that a verifiable system should have adequate performance for a select range of tasks that include text chats, cryptocurrency wallets, and voice calls. Certain high-risk individuals such as politicians, journalists, executives, whistleblowers, and activists may be willing to use a device that forgoes bells and whistles in exchange for privacy and security. With this in mind, the <https://betrusted.io>Betrusted project brings together a curated set of verifiable components as an open source mobile communications platform - a combination open source hardware and software distribution. We are sharing Betrusted with the community in the hopes that others may adopt it as a reference design for developing and deploying all manner of open platforms that require a higher level of trust and security.

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name: Open Source is Insufficient to Solve Trust Problems in Hardware: How Betrusted Aims to Close the Hardware TOCTOU Gap


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: A deep dive into power generation process, industrial solutions and their security implications. Flavoured with vulnerabilities, penetration testing (security assessment) methodology and available remediation approaches. The research studies a very widespread industrial site throughout the world – power generation plants. Specifically, the heart of power generation – turbines and its DCS – control system managing all operations for powering our TVs and railways, gaming consoles and manufacturing, kettles and surveillance systems. We will share our notes on how those systems are functioning, where they are located network-wise and what security challenges are facing owners of power generation. A series of vulnerabilities will be disclosed along with prioritisation of DCS elements (hosts) and attack vectors. Discussed vulnerabilities are addressed by vendor of one of the most widespread DCS on our planet. During the talk we will focus on methodology how to safely assess your DCS installation, which security issues you should try to address in the first place and how to perform do-it-yourself remediation. Most of the remediation steps are confirmed by vendor which is crucial for industrial owners.

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name: On the insecure nature of turbine control systems in power generation: A security study of turbine control systems in power generation


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: So wie Farnpflanzen ihre Sporen aus der Kapsel mit bis zu 10m/s heraus in die Welt katapultieren, auf dass sie dort auf fruchtbaren Boden fallen, werden unsere 8 Expert*innen ihr Nerd- und Fach-Wissen weitergeben – spektakulär, wirkungsvoll und unterhaltsam. So bunt wie die besten Slams, so dicht wie die besten Lightning Talks: 8 Antworten auf die Frage, warum Techies und Ökos zusammengehören. Bei der Bits&Bäume 2018 kamen Aktivist*innen der Tech-Community und jene der Nachhaltigkeitsrichtungen zusammen, um einander ihre Fragen und Lösungsansätze zu erklären, sie zu diskutieren und gemeinsam eine bessere Zukunft zu erdenken. Wichtiger Teil war dabei auch einzutauchen in die jeweilig anderen Mikrokosmen, einander abzuholen und die Schnittstellen zu finden. Das erste „Sporangium“ hat in diesem Sinne wichtige Themen beider Bereiche aufgegriffen. Für den C3 liegt nun der Fokus auf der Verbindung von Technologie und Nachhaltigkeit: Wie kann digitale Nachhaltigkeit, wie nachhaltige Digitalisierung aussehen? Speaker*innen (A-Z...äh...V!): * Anja Höfner – Das Märchen von der Dematerialisierung durch Technik * Carina Haupt: Nachhaltige Softwareentwicklung (für weniger explodierende Raketen) * Elenos Manifesti & der Chor der Vermummten: Wir fordern! Das Bits&Bäume-Manifest * Isabella Hermann: Utopia Outer Space? Die Zukunft der Menschheit in Science-Fiction-Filmen * joliyea – Raum für Wissen. Wo wir uns treffen, um die Welt zu retten * Kathrin Henneberger – Ja, Klimakrise! Immernoch!! * Lisa Passing: Ökostrom != Ökostrom. Down the green energy rabbit hole * Viktor Schlüter: Datenschutz? Klimaschutz? Zukunft! * Durchs Sporangium katapultieren wie immer julika & Rainer

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name: Das Bits&Bäume-Sporangium: 8 Mikrokosmen, 8 Expert*innen, je 8 Minuten zu Digitalisierung und Nachhaltigkeit


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Kommet zusammen Ihr Jüngerinnen der Bits und Bytes und hörtet die frohe Kunde des offenen Sourcecodes. Halleluhjaz! Am Anfang stand das NOP. Am Ende steht das NOPE. Lasst euch verwirren von Interpunktion und Kommentaren. Seid stark im Anblicke der zweiköpfigen Schlange! Die Zeit ist reif den offenen Sourcecode zu predigen. Kommet in Scharen! Bringet Kind und Kegel. Für alle Altergruppen (geboren vor Greased Weasel, über Erotic Pickel Hering bis hin zu Sheep on Meth)

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name: Open Code Verlesung: Lesung des öffentlichen Sourcecodes


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: 3D-gedruckte Kleidungsstücke finden sich mittlerweile auf immer mehr Laufstegen in der Modebranche. Der Herstellungsprozess erlaubt gänzlich neue Abläufe und die Chance, durch mehrfache Materialverwendung und Abfallreduzierung nachhaltiger zu produzieren. Aber wie alltagstauglich und bequem sind diese Teile eigentlich? Wann ist ein Kleidungsstück überhaupt bequem? Welche Funktionen können 3D-gedruckte textile Flächen übernehmen – und welche nicht? Die Bekleidungsbranche ist eine der schädlichsten Industrien für unseren Planeten und unsere Gesellschaft. Additive Fertigungsverfahren scheinen eine Alternative zu umweltschädlicher Massenfertigung zu sein. Der Talk beantwortet Fragen nach Qualität und Nutzen 3D-gedruckter textiler Flächen und ob diese tatsächlich das Potential haben, die Bekleidungsindustrie nachhaltiger zu gestalten. Und ist es wirklich realistisch, dass wir bald alle zuhause einen 3D-Drucker stehen haben und uns morgens einen Pullover drucken?

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Warum 3D-gedruckte Kleidung NICHT die Zukunft ist