uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Certain file formats, like Microsoft Word and PDF, are known to have features that allow for outbound requests to be made when the file opens. Other file formats allow for similar interactions but are not well-known for allowing such functionality. In this talk, we explore various file formats and their ability to make outbound requests, as well as what that means from a security and privacy perspective. Most interestingly, these techniques are not built on mistakes, but intentional design decisions, meaning that they will not be fixed as bugs. From data loss prevention to de-anonymization to request forgery to NTLM credential capture, this presentation will explore what it means to have files that communicate to various endpoints when opened. Speaker bios: Daniel (aka "unicornFurnace") is a Security Consultant for NCC Group. Daniel denies all allegations regarding unicorn smuggling and questions your character for even suggesting it. Daniel has developed configurable testbeds such as SQLol and XMLmao for training and research regarding specific vulnerabilities. Daniel enjoys climbing large rocks. Daniel has been working in the information security industry since 2004 and is a frequent speaker at conferences including Black Hat, DEF CON, Shmoocon, and SOURCE. Daniel does his own charcuterie. Daniel also holds the title of Baron in the micronation of Sealand. Damon Smith is an Associate Security Engineer with NCC Group, an information security firm specializing in application, network, and mobile security. Damon specializes in web application assessments, embedded device/point of sale assessments, network penetration testing, and mobile testing. Damon graduated with a BS is Computer Science from the University of Texas, with a focus on Information Security. He has experience working as an IT consultant in the legal and retail industries and further as a security consultant focusing on application assessments.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Bugged Files: Is Your Document Telling on You?


Daniel Selifonov

type: Person

cs: Informatika

de: Informatik

fi: tietojenkäsittelytiede

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

en: Computer Science

fr: Informatique

da: Datalogi

es: Ciencias de la Computación

nl: Informatica

cs: Technické vědy

de: Ingenieurwissenschaften

fi: tekniikka

uk: Інженерія

en: Engineering Sciences

fr: Ingénierie

da: Ingeniørvidenskab

es: Ingeniería

nl: Engineering

description: Memory corruption vulnerabilities have plagued computer systems since we started programming software. Techniques for transforming memory corruption primitives into arbitrary code execution exploits have evolved significantly over the past two decades, from "smashing the stack for fun and profit" to the current apex of "just in time code reuse" while playing a cat and mouse game with similarly evolving defensive mitigations: from PaX/NX-bit to fine-grained ASLR and beyond. By contextualizing this battle between attack and defense, I will demonstrate new defense strategies based on augmenting fine-grained ASLR with memory disclosure mitigations to render existing exploitation techniques unreliable. Modifications to the Xen hypervisor exploiting hardware accelerated virtualization extensions on the modern Intel platform enable realizing these new defense strategies without imposing significant runtime CPU overhead. Speaker Bio: Daniel Selifonov is currently an engineer focused on information security, and in prior consultancies has built systems for information technology where security was considered throughout design and implementation, rather than as an afterthought. His research interests in security include reverse engineering, applied cryptography, client side security, and user acceptable information system design.

TIB AV-Portal

type: Service

type: WebContent

type: MediaObject

@language: en

cs: přihlášení není vyžadováno

de: keine Anmeldung erforderlich

uk: вхід без авторизації

en: no login required

nl: geen login vereist

name: Drinking from LETHE: New methods of exploiting and mitigating memory corruption vulnerabilities

DEF CON

type: Organization

cs: Video

de: Video

fi: Video

uk: Відео

en: Video

fr: Vidéo

da: Video

nl: Video

es: Video


2/2 Causality in Conformal Field Theory

cs: Matematika

de: Mathematik

fi: matematiikka

uk: Математика

en: Mathematics

fr: Mathématiques

da: Matematik

es: Matemáticas

nl: Wiskunde

de: Mathematik, Naturwissenschaften

uk: Математика, природничі науки

en: Mathematics, Natural Sciences

description: Causality places nontrivial constraints on QFT in Lorentzian signature, for example fixing the signs of certain terms in the low energy Lagrangian. In these pedagogical lectures, I will explore causality constraints on conformal field theory. First, I will show how causality is encoded in crossing symmetry and reflection positivity of Euclidean correlators, and derive constraints on the interactions of low-lying operators directly from the conformal bootstrap. Then, I will explain the connection between these causality constraints and the averaged null energy condition. Finally, I will use causality to show that the averaged null energy is positive in interacting quantum field theory in flat spacetime. Based on arXiv:1509.00014, arXiv:1601.07904, arXiv:1610.05308.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Institut des Hautes Études Scientifiques (IHÉS)

addressCountry: FR

addressLocality: Bures-sur-Yvette

addressRegion: Île-de-France


Alice and Bob are Really Confused

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: There have been over 20 cryptoparties in New York City, in which people are introduced to open source cryptography software. This doesn't always go smoothly. Usability experts have only recently being included in the design process for encryption tools, but by and large what we have to work with were designed by cryptography experts in the 90s. I'll be going over some pain points between real-world users and their real-life encounters with open source cryptography tools. David Huerta ships critical art in suspicious packages and helps organize cryptoparties, which bring technologists and everyone else in New York together to learn how to protect their online privacy. Before arriving in New York, he dropped out of Arizona State University and was one of the founding members for HeatSync Labs, an Arizona hackerspace which brings makers, hackers, and the occasional futurist together to build things and teach others how to do the same.

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Docker is all the rage these days. Everyone is talking about it and investing in it, from startups to enterprises and everything in between. But is it secure? What are the costs and benefits of using it? Is this just a huge risk or a huge opportunity? There's a while lot of ranting and raving going on, but not nearly enough rational discourse. I'll cover the risks and rewards of using Docker and similar technologies such as AppC as well as discuss the larger implications of using orchestration systems like Mesos or Kubernetes. This talk will cover the deep technical issues to be concerned about as well as the pragmatic realities of the real world. Speaker Bio: David Mortman is the Chief Security Architect and Distinguished Engineer at Dell Software and is a Contributing Analyst at Securosis. Before Dell, he ran operations and security for C3. Formerly the Chief Information Security Officer for Siebel Systems, Inc., Previously, Mr. Mortman was Manager of IT Security at Network Associates. Mr. Mortman has also been a regular panelist and speaker at RSA, Blackhat, DEF CON and BruCon as well. Mr.Mortman sits on a variety of advisoryboards including Qualys, Lookout and Risk I/O. He holds a BS in Chemistry from the University of Chicago. David writes for Securosis, Emergent Chaos and the New School blogs.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Docker, Docker, Give Me The News, I Got A Bad Case Of Securing You


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Access control systems are everywhere. They are used to protect everything from residential communities to commercial offices. People depend on these to work properly, but what if I had complete control over your access control solution just by using my phone? Or perhaps I input a secret keypad combination that unlocks your front door? You may not be as secure as you think. The world relies on access control systems to ensure that secured areas are only accessible to authorized users. Usually, a keypad is the only thing stopping an unauthorized person from accessing the private space behind it. There are many types of access control systems from stand-alone keypads to telephony access control. In this talk, Dennis will be going over how and where access control systems are used. Dennis will walk through and demonstrate the tips and tricks used in bypassing common access control systems. This presentation will include attack methods of all nature including physical attacks, RFID, wireless, telephony, network, and more. Dennis Maldonado is a Security Consultant at KLC Consulting. His current work includes vulnerability management, penetration testing, infrastructure risk assessment and security research. Dennis’ focus is encompassing all forms information security into an assessment in order to better simulate a real world attack against systems and infrastructure. As a security researcher and evangelist, Dennis spends his time sharing what he knows about Information Security with anyone willing to learn. Dennis has presented at numerous workshops and meetups in the Houston area. Dennis co-founded Houston Locksport in Houston, Texas where he shares his love for lock-picking physical security.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Are We Really Safe? Hacking access control systems


How the ELF ruined Christmas

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The ELF format is ancient, and much mystery lurks in its dark depths. For 16 years, it has safely encompassed our software, providing support for binary loading, symbol resolution, and lots of very useful binary stuff. In that time, security has become a key concern, resulting in binary defenses like NX and ASLR, which have made exploiting vulnerabilities quite difficult. ASLR, for example, randomizes the location of the stack, the heap, libraries, and (optionally), the binary itself at every execution of an application. There is no easy way to say this: ELF has let us down. In this talk, we'll explore the dark side of ELF. Specifically, we'll show how ELF, by design, implicitly trusts data structures in the ELF headers. Even in the presence of ASLR, an attacker able to corrupt these headers can trick the ELF loader into calling any function in any linked-in library, providing nothing but the name of the binary. In essence, this technique allows an attacker to call arbitrary library functions (such as system()!) without leaking memory addresses. We call this technique Leakless. While developing Leakless, we checked many different implementations of the standard C library and found that Leakless can be adapted to attack the ELF loader implementations in all of the common ones (i.e., GNU libc, the libc of the major BSDs, and uClibc). In this talk, we'll describe the internals of the ELF format, show how Leakless works to subvert library function resolution, and demonstrate how it can be use to carry out attacks without information disclosures. And, of course, we'll open-source the tool that we developed to make carrying out this attack easier. Speaker Bios: Alessandro is a PhD student at Politecnico Di Milano, right under that leaning tower. In his spare time, he hacks with Tower of Hanoi. He likes exploitation and doing really crazy stuff, on and off the computer! Hacking since the age of eight, Yan Shoshitaishvili is fascinated by understanding and commandeering the computation and actions carried out by binary code. He is currently pursuing his PhD in the Seclab at UC Santa Barbara and is one of the hacking aces behind team Shellphish. In the little spare time he has left, he develops and releases computer security tools on the Internet.

uk: вхід без авторизації


Hacker in the Wires

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: This talk will show attendees how to use a small ARM-based computer that is connected inline to a wired network for penetration testing. The computer is running a full-featured penetration testing Linux distro. Data may be exfiltrated using the network or via a ZigBee mesh network or GSM modem. The device discussed in this talk is easily integrated into a powerful penetration test that is performed with an army of ARM-based small computer systems connected by XBee or ZigBee mesh networking. Some familiarity with Linux and penetration testing would be helpful, but not required. Speaker Bio: Phil was born at an early age. He cleaned out his savings at age 8 in order to buy a TI99-4A computer for the sum of $450. Two years later he learned 6502 assembly and has been hacking computers and electronics ever since. Dr. Phil currently works as a professor at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania. His research focus over the last few years has been on the use of microcontrollers and small embedded computers for forensics and pentesting. Phil has developed a custom pentesting Linux distro and related hardware to allow an inexpensive army of remote pentesting drones to be built using the BeagleBone Black computer boards. This work is described in detail in Phil's book "Hacking and Penetration Testing With Low Power Devices" (Syngress, 2015). Prior to entering academia, Phil held several high level positions at well-known US companies. He holds a couple of the usual certs one might expect for someone in his position. When not working, he likes to spend time with his family, fly, hack electronics, and has been known to build airplanes.

uk: вхід без авторизації


One Device to Pwn Them All

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: This talk will present a device that can be used as a dropbox, remote hacking drone, hacking command console, USB writeblocker, USB Mass Storage device impersonator, or scripted USB HID device. The device is based on the BeagleBone Black, can be battery operated for several days, and is easily constructed for under $100. The dropbox, remote hacking drone, and hacking command console functionality were presented at DEF CON 21. This talk will emphasize the new USB-based attack functionality. Topics will include injecting payloads by emulating an optionally write-protected USB mass storage device, rapidly executing commands on a target using the BeagleBone Black operating as a scripted USB HID device, USB mass storage device impersonation, and other attacks that can be performed with brief physical access to the target. Some familiarity with Linux and USB devices would be helpful, but not required. All hardware and software to be discussed is 100% open source. Speaker Bio: Phil was born at an early age. He cleaned out his savings at age 8 in order to buy a TI99-4A computer for the sum of $450. Two years later he learned 6502 assembly and has been hacking computers and electronics ever since. Dr. Phil currently works as a professor at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania. His research focus over the last few years has been on the use of microcontrollers and small embedded computers for forensics and pentesting. Phil has developed a custom pentesting Linux distro and related hardware to allow an inexpensive army of remote pentesting drones to be built using the BeagleBone Black computer boards. This work is described in detail in Phil's book "Hacking and Penetration Testing With Low Power Devices" (Syngress, 2015). Prior to entering academia, Phil held several high level positions at well-known US companies. He holds a couple of the usual certs one might expect for someone in his position. When not working, he likes to spend time with his family, fly, hack electronics, and has been known to build airplanes.

uk: вхід без авторизації


DT and 1057 - Welcome to DEF CON

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: opening ceremonies at DEF CON 23

uk: вхід без авторизації


Crypto for Hackers

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Hacking is hard. It takes passion, dedication, and an unwavering attention to detail. Hacking requires a breadth of knowledge spread across many domains. We need to have experience with different platforms, operating systems, software packages, tools, programming languages, and technology trends. Being overly deficient in any one of these areas can add hours to our hack, or even worse, bring us total failure. And while all of these things are important for a well-rounded hacker, one of the key areas that is often overlooked is cryptography. In an era dominated by security breaches, an understanding of encryption and hashing algorithms provides a tremendous advantage. We can better hone our attack vectors, especially when looking for security holes. A few years ago I released the first Blu-Ray device key, AA856A1BA814AB99FFDEBA6AEFBE1C04, by exploiting a vulnerability in an implementation of the AACS protocol. As hacks go, it was a simple one. But it was the knowledge of crypto that made it all possible. This presentation is an overview of the most common crypto routines helpful to hackers. We'll review the strengths and weaknesses of each algorithm, which ones to embrace, and which ones to avoid. You'll get C++ code examples, high-level wrapper classes, and an open-source library that implements all the algorithms. We'll even talk about creative ways to merge algorithms to further increase entropy and key strength. If you've ever wanted to learn how crypto can give you an advantage as a hacker, then this talk is for you. With this information you'll be able to maximize your hacks and better protect your personal data. Speaker Bio: Eijah is the founder of demonsaw, a secure and anonymous content sharing platform, and a Senior Programmer at a world-renowned game development studio. He has over 15 years of software development and IT Security experience. His career has covered a broad range of Internet and mid-range technologies, core security, and system architecture. Eijah has been a faculty member at multiple colleges, has spoken about security and development at conferences, and holds a master’s degree in Computer Science. Eijah is an active member of the hacking community and is an avid proponent of Internet freedom.

uk: вхід без авторизації


What is fuzzing?

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Fuzzing is a well-established technique for finding bugs, hopefully exploitable ones, by brute forcing inputs to explore code paths in an application. In recent years, fuzzing has become a near mandatory part of any major application's security team efforts. Our work focused on fuzzing web browsers, a particularly difficult challenge given the size and quality of some of their security teams, the existing high-quality fuzzers available for this, and, of late, bug bounty programs. Despite this, our improved fuzzing approach was able to find four confirmed bugs within Google Chrome and two within Microsoft Internet Explorer 11. The bugs had varying potential exploitability. Interestingly, some had been independently discovered indicating others are active in this field. The work is on going, and we hope to have more before the presentation. As browsers continue to grow as the new universal interface for devices and applications, they have become high value targets for exploitation. Additionally, with the growth of browser fuzzing since 2004, this is a complex field to get started in. Something we hope to help address. Our research and presentation will consist of two parts: The first part is an introduction to fuzzing for the security practitioner. Here we combine the approaches, tool sets and integrations between tools we found to be most effective into a recipe for fuzzing various browsers and various platforms. The second part is a description of our work and approach used to create, and extend, browser fuzzing grammars based on w3c specifications to discover new and unexplored code paths, and find new browser security bugs. In particular, example of real bugs found in the Chrome and IE browser will be demonstrated. Speaker Bios: Saif is the body double for Borat, but couldn't pull off a mankini and ended up in information security. His focus is on fuzzing and vulnerability research. Etienne hopes he will outlive his beard, but in the meantime, this hacking schtick pays for beard oil. His other interests lie in mobile applications and no-sql databases. Both are analysts within SensePost's London office.

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Regular Expression Denial of Service has existed for well over a decade, but has not received the love it deserves lately. There are some proof of concept attacks out there currently, most of which are ineffective due to implementation optimizations. Regardless of the effectiveness most of these PoC's are geared only to NFA engines. This talk will demonstrate working PoC's that bypass optimizations. Both NFA and DFA engines will get love. Tools will be released (with demonstration) that benchmark NFA/DFA engines and automate creation of 'evil strings' given an arbitrary regular expression. Attendees can expect a review of regex and a deep under the hood explanation of both regex engines before abuses ensue. ^ Not a security researcher

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: RE: Exploring Regular Expression Denial of Service


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Inter-VM data exfiltration: The art of cache timing covert channel on x86 multi-core Etienne Martineau Software engineer, Cisco Systems On x86 multi-core covert channels between co-located Virtual Machine (VM) are real and practical thanks to the architecture that has many imperfections in the way shared resources are isolated. This talk will demonstrate how a non-privileged application from one VM can ex-filtrate data or even establish a reverse shell into a co-located VM using a cache timing covert channel that is totally hidden from the standard access control mechanisms while being able to offer surprisingly high bps at a low error rate. In this talk you'll learn about the various concepts, techniques and challenges involve in the design of a cache timing covert channel on x86 multi-core such as: An overview of some of the X86 shared resources and how we can use / abuse them to carry information across VMs. Fundamental concept behind cache line encoding / decoding. Getting around the hardware pre-fetching logic ( without disabling it from the BIOS! ) Data persistency and noise. What can be done? Guest to host page table de-obfuscation. The easy way. Phase Lock Loop and high precision inter-VM synchronization. All about timers. At the end of this talk we will go over a working VM to VM reverse shell example as well as some surprising bandwidth measurement results. We will also cover the detection aspect and the potential countermeasure to defeat such a communication channel. The source code is going to be release at that time on 'github' Speaker Bio: Etienne holds bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from University Laval at Quebec and is currently a senior technical leader at Cisco Systems. He has over 15 years' mission critical Linux in telecom and space industry experience. His career has covered broad range of high performance / high availability hardware and software technologies, system level architecture and since 2008 a very special focus on the KVM hypervisor. He likes to work on complex and challenging problems but when not working, he likes to spend time with his family and during the night hack virtual machines or rebuild car engines.

uk: вхід без авторизації


Abusing XSLT for Practical Attacks

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Over the years, XML has been a rich target for attackers due to flaws in its design as well as implementations. It is a tempting target because it is used by other programming languages to interconnect applications and is supported by web browsers. In this talk, I will demonstrate how to use XSLT to produce documents that are vulnerable to new exploits. XSLT can be leveraged to affect the integrity of arithmetic operations, lead to code logic failure, or cause random values to use the same initialization vector. Error disclosure has always provided valuable information, but thanks to XSLT, it is possible to partially read system files that could disclose service or system's passwords. Finally, XSLT can be used to compromise end-user confidentiality by abusing the same-origin policy concept present in web browsers. This presentation includes proof-of-concept attacks demonstrating XSLT’s potential to affect production systems, along with recommendations for safe development. Speaker Bio: Fernando Arnaboldi is a senior security researcher and consultant at IOActive, Inc. He has over 10 years of experience in the security research space (Deloitte, Core Security Technologies and IOActive) and holds a Bachelor's degree in Computer Science.

uk: вхід без авторизації


1/2 Causality in Conformal Field Theory

uk: Математика, природничі науки

uk: вхід без авторизації


Pivoting Without Rights

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: One of the most challenging steps of a penetration test is popping something and not having full administrative level rights over the system. Companies are cutting back on administrative level rights for endpoints or how about those times where you popped an external web application and were running as Apache or Network Service? Privilege escalation or pillaging systems can be difficult and require extensive time if successful at all. One of the most challenging aspects around pentesting was the need to have administrative level rights, install your tools, and from there leverage the compromised machine as a pivot point for lateral movement in the network. Well, the time has changed. Introducing Pivoter – a reverse connection transparent proxy that supports the ability to pivot with ease. Pivoter is a full transparent proxy that supports the ability to use limited rights on a system to pivot to other systems and attack transparently from your system at home. Port scans, exploits, brute forcing, anything you could do like you were on that network is now available through Pivoter. As part of this talk, we’ll be releasing a new Metasploit module for shell DLL injection for AV evasion, a Linux version of Pivoter, a Windows version of Pivoter, and a PowerShell version of Pivoter. msf, run pivoter, pentest as if you are on the internal network even if you don’t have admin rights. Also during this talk, we’ll be releasing a new major release of the Social-Engineer Toolkit (SET) which incorporates Pivoter into the payload delivery system. Speaker Bios: Geoff Walton is a Senior Security Consultant for Cleveland-based TrustedSec. He joined after years of working in information security. Geoff’s expertise in pen testing, network security, and software analysis comes form over ten years experience in a variety of information technology roles including software development, network operations and information security specific functions; Geoff brings broad vision to assessments and penetration test engagements. Geoff has been part of diverse IT teams at organizations both large and small. He has experience across several industries including retail, professional services, and manufacturing. Dave Kennedy is founder of TrustedSec and Binary Defense Systems. Both organizations focus on the betterment of the security industry from an offense and a defense perspective. David was the former Chief Security Officer (CSO) for a Fortune 1000 company where he ran the entire information security program. Kennedy is a co-author of the book "Metasploit: The Penetration Testers Guide," the creator of the Social-Engineer Toolkit (SET), and Artillery. Kennedy has been interviewed by several news organizations including CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, CNBC, Katie Couric, and BBC World News. Kennedy is the co-host of the social-engineer podcast and on a number of additional podcasts. Kennedy has testified in front of Congress on two occasions on the security around government websites. Kennedy is one of the co-authors of the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES); a framework designed to fix the penetration testing industry. Kennedy is the co-founder of DerbyCon, a large-scale conference in Louisville Kentucky. Prior to Diebold, Kennedy was a VP of Consulting and Partner of a mid-size information security consulting company running the security consulting practice. Prior to the private sector, Kennedy worked for the United States Marine Corps and deployed to Iraq twice for intelligence related missions. Twitter: @HackingDave

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: A pass the hash (PtH) attack is one of the most devastating attacks to execute on the systems in a Windows domain. Many system admins are unaware about this type of attack and the amount of damage it can do. This presentation is for the system admins that don't have a full time forensics person working with them. This presentation will help identify key windows events and explain why these events are important. The presentation will also show various free tools that can assist in examining some of the common evidence left behind. The presentation will explain and demonstrate a pass the hash attack against common windows systems in an example domain. In the end, the presentation may offer some insight into what an attacker wants and needs to use PtH to pivot in a network. Speaker Bio: Gerard has been in the IT industry for almost 20 years. He has held various network admin, system admin, web admin and security related positions throughout his career. He currently works for a Fortune 50 company doing compromise forensics and malware reverse engineering.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Forensic Artifacts From a Pass the Hash (PTH) Attack


#HamSammich (A replacement talk)

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The ProxyHam talk was mysteriously canceled. However, it’s easy to replicate the talk from the press coverage. In this talk, we propose “HamSammich”, creating a point-to-point link in order to access WiFi from many miles away, as a means to avoid detection. We show how off-the-shelf devices can be configured to do this for less than $200. After demonstrating the working system, we’ll talk about radio signals. This includes both the FCC regulatory issues which may have caused the cancelation of the original talk, as well as signals-intelligence, and the practicalities of being detected and caught. Finally, we’ll talk about hiding signals with SDR, a more complicated and expensive technique, but one that hides better in the electromagnetic spectrum. We’ll demonstrate not only a working system, but what the 900MHz spectrum looks like, and how to track down a working system. Speaker Bios: Robert Graham is the CEO of Errata Security, a pentest/consulting firm. He's known for creating the first IPS, the BlackICE series of products, sidejacking, and masscan. In his spare time, he scans the Internet. He has been speaking at several conferences a year for the past decade.Twitter: @ErrataRob David Maynor is the CTO of Errata Security, and chief pentester. He’s a frequent speaker at conferences, most infamously in the Apple WiFi scandal. In his spare time, he builds weapons for Skynet’s domination of the planet. Twitter: @Dave_Maynor

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Математика, природничі науки

description: We will introduce the notion of perfectoid spaces. The theory can be seen as a kind of rigid geometry of infinite type, and the most important feature is that the theories over (deeply ramified extensions of) Q_p and over F_p((t)) are equivalent, generalizing to the relative situation a theorem of Fontaine-Wintenberger, and also implying a strong form of Faltings's almost purity theorem. This method of changing the characteristic is then applied to deduce many cases of the weight-monodromy conjecture.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Fondation mathématique Jacques Hadamard (FMJH)

name: 6/6 Perfectoid Spaces and the Weight-Monodromy Conjecture


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The Open Network Install Environment, or ONIE, makes commodity or WhiteBox Ethernet possible. By placing a common, Linux-based, install environment onto the firmware of the switch, customers can deploy the Network Operating Systems of their choice onto the switch and do so whenever they like without replacing the hardware. The problem is, if this gets compromised, it also makes it possible for hackers to install malware onto the switch. Malware that can manipulate it and your network, and keep doing it long after a Network Operating System reinstall. With no secure boot, no encryption, no authentication, predictable HTTP/TFTP waterfalls, and exposed post-installation partition, ONIE is very susceptible to compromise. And with Network Operating Systems such as Switch Light, Cumulus Linux, and Mellanox-OS via their agents Indigo and eSwitchd not exactly putting up a fight with problems like no authentication, no encryption, poor encryption, and insufficient isolation, this is a real possibility. In this session, we'll cover the weaknesses in ONIE, ways to reach the platform through these Network Operating Systems, and what can happen if we don't properly protect the Control Plane these switches run on. I'll even demonstrate with a drive-by web-attack that is able to pivot through a Windows management station to reach the isolated control plane network, and infect one of these ONIE-based switches with malware, malware that's there even after a refresh. You'll even get the source code to take home with you to see how easily it's done. Finally, we'll talk about how to compensate for these issues so that your network doesn't become infected with and manipulated by this sort of persistent firmware-level malware. Speaker Bio: Gregory Pickett CISSP, GCIA, GPEN has a background in intrusion analysis for Fortune 100 companies but now heads up Hellfire Security’s Managed Security Services efforts and participates in their assessment practice as a network security subject matter expert. As a security professional, his primary area of focus and occasional research is networks with an interest in using network traffic to better understand, to better defend, and sometimes to better exploit the hosts that live on them. He holds a B.S. in Psychology which is completely unrelated but interesting to know. While it does nothing to contribute to how he makes a living, it does demonstrate how screwed up he actually is. Twitter: @Shogun7273

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Staying Persistent in Software Defined Networks


Closing Ceremonies

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: DEF CON 23 Closing Ceremonies

uk: вхід без авторизації


LTE Tracking and Recon with RTLSDR

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Since RTLSDR became a consumer grade RX device, numerous talks and open source tools enabled the community to monitor airplanes, ships, and cars... but come on, what we really want to track are cell phones. If you know how to run cmake and have $50 to pick up an RTLSDR-E4000, I'll make sure you walk out of here with the power to monitor LTE devices around you on a slick Kibana4 dashboard. You'll also get a primer on geolocating the devices if you've got a second E4000 and some basic soldering skills. Speaker Bio: Ian has 10 years of experience studying the global RF emissions environment. Professionally, he uses this knowledge to rapidly hack up communication platforms and conduct RF surveys for pentesting and red teaming activities. Personnally, he can be found listening to satellites and building databses of all the cars that park on his block with TPMS. He currently supports Wolf Den Associates as Red Team leader and Digital Signature Specialist.

uk: вхід без авторизації


ThruGlassXfer: Remote Access, the APT

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: ThruGlassXfer (TGXf) is a new and exciting technique to steal files from a computer through the screen. Any user that has screen and keyboard access to a shell (CLI, GUI or browser) in an enterprise IT environment has the ability to transfer arbitrary data, code and executables in and out of that environment without raising alarms, today. This includes staff, partners and suppliers, both on and off-shore. And implementation of best practice Data Center (Jump hosts), Perimeter / Remote Access (VPN, VDI, ..) and End Point Security (DLP, AV, ..) architectures have no effect on the outcome. In this session I will take you from first principles to a full exploitation framework. At the end of the session you'll learn how build on this unidirectional file transfer and augment the solution into a full duplex communications channel (a virtual serial link) and then a native PPP link, from an user owned device, through the remote enterprise-controlled screen and keyboard, to the most sensitive infrastructure in the enterprise. In this special DEF CON presentation I will also be releasing the new high-speed data exfiltration tool, hsTGXf. This is an exciting and cross-discipline presentation that picks up the story in the DEC VT220 terminal era and will take you on a journey to exploiting modern enterprise security architectures. So join me, whatever your knowledge or skill-set and learn something interesting! Speaker Bio: A 20 year veteran of the IT industry, Ian has spent 15 years working in security in a number of positions including Penetration Tester, Security Architect and most recently, a Security Governance role at a blue chip corporate. Ian teaches the Practical Threat Intelligence course at Black Hat and has spoken at key international hacking and security conferences including COSAC (Ireland), Ruxcon (Australia), and Kiwicon (New Zealand). If he had spare time, Ian would be pursuing a number of private software and robotics projects, including the Barbie Car that he promised his daughter (wiser friends have advised that I finish this project before she's old enough to ask for a real Corvette).

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The post-exploitation activities in a penetration test can be challenging if the tester has low-privileges on a fully patched, well configured Windows machine. This work presents a technique for helping the tester to find useful information by sniffing network traffic of the applications on the compromised machine, despite his low-privileged rights. Furthermore, the encrypted traffic is also captured before being sent to the encryption layer, thus all traffic (clear-text and encrypted) can be sniffed. The implementation of this technique is a tool called NetRipper which uses API hooking to do the actions mentioned above and which has been especially designed to be used in penetration tests, but the concept can also be used to monitor network traffic of employees or to analyze a malicious application. Speaker Bio Ionut works as a Senior Security Consultant at KPMG in Romania. He is passionate about ASM, reverse engineering, shellcode and exploit development and he has a MCTS Windows Internals certification. He spoke at various security conferences in Romania like: Defcamp, OWASP local meetings and others and also at the yearly Hacknet KPMG international conference in Helsinki and Berlin. Ionut is also the main administrator of the biggest Romanian IT security community: rstforums.com and he writes technical articles on a blog initiated by a passionate team: securitycafe.ro. Twitter: @NytroRST

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: NetRipper: Smart Traffic Sniffing for Penetration Testers


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: 2014 was a year of unprecedented participation in crowdsourced and static bug bounty programs, and 2015 looks like a trendmaker. Join Jason as he explores successful tactics and tools used by himself and the best bug hunters. Practical methodologies, tools, and tips make you better at hacking websites and mobile apps to claim those bounties. Convert edge-case vulnerabilities to practical pwnage even on presumably heavily tested sites. These are tips and tricks that the every-tester can take home and use. Jason will focus on philosophy, discovery, mapping, tactical fuzzing (XSS, SQLi, LFI, ++), CSRF, web services, and mobile vulnerabilities. In many cases we will explore these attacks down to the parameter, teaching the tester common places to look when searching for certain bugs. In addition he will cover common evasions to filters and as many time saving techniques he can fit in. Speaker Bio: Jason is the Director of Technical Operations at Bugcrowd. Jason trains and works with internal application security engineers to triage and validate hardcore vulnerabilities in mobile, web, and IoT applications/devices. He also works with Bugcrowd to improve the security industries relations with the researchers. Jason’s interests and areas of expertise include, mobile penetration testing, black box web application auditing, network/infrastructural security assessments, binary reverse engineering, and static analysis.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: How to Shot Web (Better hacking in 2015)


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: We've heard about hypothetical quantum computers breaking most of the public-key crypto in use—RSA, elliptic curves, etc.—and we've heard about "post-quantum" systems that resist quantum computers. We also heard about quantum computers' potential to solve other problems considerably faster than classical computers, such as discrete optimization, machine learning, or code verification problems. And we heard about a commercial quantum computer, and we heard vendors of quantum key distribution or quantum random number generators promise us security as solid as the laws of physics. Still, most of us are clueless regarding: How quantum computers work and why they could solve certain problems faster than classical computers? What are the actual facts and what is FUD, hype, or journalistic exaggeration? Could quantum computers help in defending classical computers and networks against intrusions? Is it worth spending money in post-quantum systems, quantum key distribution, or in purchasing or developing of a quantum computer? Will usable quantum computers be built in the foreseeable future? This talk gives honest answers to those questions, based on the latest research, on analyses of the researchers' and vendors' claims, and on a cost-benefit-risk analyses. We'll expose the fundamental principles of quantum computing in a way comprehensible by anyone, and we'll skip the technical details that require math and physics knowledge. Yet after this talk you'll best be able to assess the risk of quantum computers, to debunk misleading claims, and to ask the right questions. Speaker Bio: Jean-Philippe (JP) Aumasson is Principal Cryptographer at Kudelski Security, in Switzerland. He is known for designing the cryptographic functions BLAKE, BLAKE2, SipHash, and NORX. He has spoken at conferences such as Black Hat, RSA, and CCC, and initiated the Crypto Coding Standard and the Password Hashing Competition projects. He co-wrote the 2015 book "The Hash Function BLAKE". He is member of the technical advisory board of the Open Crypto Audit Project and of the Underhanded Crypto Contest. JP tweets as @veorq. Twitter: @veorq

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Quantum Computers vs. Computers Security


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The term “Bad USB” has gotten some much needed press in last few months. There have been talks that have identified the risks that are caused by the inherent trust between the OS and any device attached by USB. I found in my research that most of the available payloads for the USB rubber ducky would be stopped by common enterprise security solutions. I then set out to create a new exploit that would force the victim to trust my Man-In-The-Middle access point. After my payload is deployed, all Wi-Fi communications will be readable, including usernames, passwords and authentication cookies. The attack will work without the need of elevating privileges, which makes it ideal for corporate environments. Speaker Bio: Jeremy has built his career around protecting assets in the most critical IT sectors. He started his career working in a Network Operations Security Center for the US Army. He then went on to work as a Network Security Engineer defending Dominion’s North Anna Nuclear Power Station. He is currently a Senior Network Security Engineer/Architect at Genworth Financial. He is a MBA, CISSP, CEH, GIAC GPPA, CSA CCSK, ABCDEFG… Blah Blah Blah. Jeremy has spent over 10 years researching and implementing new ways to defend against the latest attacks. He enjoys creating new exploits and feels it makes him a more well-rounded defensive Security Engineer. He is happily married and a father to two soon to be hackers. When he’s not staring at a command prompt, he is busy building and driving demolition derby cars. Twitter: @jdorrough1

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: USB Attack to Decrypt Wi-Fi Communications


NSA Playset: JTAG Implants

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: While the NSA ANT team has been busy building the next generation spy toy catalog for the next leak, the NSA Playset team has been busy catching up with more open hardware implementations. GODSURGE is a bit of software that helps to persist malware into a system. It runs on the FLUXBABBIT hardware implant that connects to the depopulated JTAG header of certain models of Dell servers. This talk will introduce SAVIORBURST, our own implementation of a jtag-based malware delivery firmware that will work hand-in-hand with SOLDERPEEK, our custom hardware design for a standalone JTAG attack device. We will demonstrate how to this pair enables the persistent compromise of an implanted system as well as release all the hardware and software necessary to port SAVIORBURST and SOLDERPEEK to your jtag-equipped target of choice. Anyone curious to know more about JTAG, regardless of previous hardware experience, will learn something from this talk. Speaker Bio: Joe has spent a decade working on low-level silicon debug, security validation, and penetration testing of CPUS, SOCs, and microcontrollers. He develops and delivers hardware security training at SecuringHardware.com, including Software Exploitation via Hardware Exploits and Applied Physical Attacks on x86 Systems. In between, he keeps busy with contributions to the NSA Playset and other misdirected hardware projects. Twitter: @securelyfitz Matt is a hardware designer and security researcher who has over a decade of experience designing, securing and exploiting hardware test and debug features on CPUs and SoCs. When not performing pointless hardware tricks Matt tries to help educate integrated circuit designers on the risks posed by hardware debug capabilities. Twitter: @syncsrc

uk: вхід без авторизації


"Quantum" Classification of Malware

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Quantum computation has recently become an important area for security research, with its applications to factoring large numbers and secure communication. In practice, only one company (D-Wave) has claimed to create a quantum computer which can solve relatively hard problems, and that claim has been met with much skepticism. Regardless of whether it is using quantum effects for computation or not, the D-Wave architecture cannot run the standard quantum algorithms, such as Grover’s and Shor’s. The D-Wave architecture is instead purported to be useful for machine learning and for heuristically solving NP-Complete problems. We'll show why the D-Wave and the machine learning problem for malware classification seem especially suited for each other. We also explain how to translate the classification problem for malicious executables into an optimization problem which a D-Wave machine can solve. Specifically, using a 512-qubit D-Wave Two processor, we show that a minimalist malware classifier, with cross-validation accuracy comparable to standard machine learning algorithms, can be created. However, even such a minimalist classifier incurs a surprising level of overhead. Speaker Bio: John Seymour is a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, where he performs research at the intersection of machine learning and information security. He's mostly interested in avoiding and helping others avoid some of the major pitfalls in machine learning, especially in dataset preparation (seriously, do people still use malware datasets from 1998?) In 2014, he completed his Master’s thesis on the subject of quantum computation applied to malware analysis. He currently works at CyberPoint International, a company which performs network and host-based machine learning, located in Baltimore, MD.

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Математика, природничі науки

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: 5/6 Perfectoid Spaces and the Weight-Monodromy Conjecture


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: With over a billion activated devices, Android holds strong as the market leading smartphone operating system. Underneath the hood, it is primarily built on the tens of gigabytes of source code from the Android Open Source Project (AOSP). Thoroughly reviewing a code base of this size is arduous at best -- arguably impossible. Several approaches exist to combat this problem. One such approach is identifying and focusing on a particularly dangerous area of code. This presentation centers around the speaker's experience researching a particularly scary area of Android, the Stagefright multimedia framework. By limiting his focus to a relatively small area of code that's critically exposed on 95% of devices, Joshua discovered a multitude of implementation issues with impacts ranging from unassisted remote code execution down to simple denial of service. Apart from a full explanation of these vulnerabilities, this presentation also discusses; techniques used for discovery, Android OS internals, and the disclosure process. Finally, proof-of-concept code will be demonstrated. After attending this presentation, you will understand how to discover vulnerabilities in Android more effectively. Joshua will show you why this particular code is so scary, what has been done to help improve the overall security of the Android operating system, and what challenges lie ahead. Speaker Bio: Joshua J. Drake is the Sr. Director of Platform Research and Exploitation at Zimperium and lead author of the Android Hacker's Handbook. Joshua focuses on original research such as reverse engineering and the analysis, discovery, and exploitation of security vulnerabilities. He has over 10 years of experience auditing and exploiting a wide range of application and operating system software with a focus on Android since early 2012. In prior roles, he served at Metasploit and VeriSign’s iDefense Labs. Joshua previously spoke at BlackHat, RSA, CanSecWest, REcon, Ruxcon/Breakpoint, Toorcon, and DerbyCon. Other notable accomplishments include exploiting Oracle's JVM for a win at Pwn2Own 2013, successfully compromising the Android browser via NFC with Georg Wicherski at BlackHat USA 2012, and winning the DEF CON 18 CTF with the ACME Pharm team in 2010. Twitter: @jduck

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Stagefright: Scary Code in the Heart of Android: Researching Android Multimedia Framework Security


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The HDMI (High Definition Multimedia Interface) standard has gained extensive market penetration. Nearly every piece of modern home theater equipment has HDMI support and most modern mobile devices actually have HDMI-capable outputs, though it may not be obvious. Lurking inside most modern HDMI-compatible devices is something called HDMI-CEC, or Consumer Electronics Control. This is the functionality that allows a media device to, for example, turn on your TV and change the TV’s input. That doesn’t sound interesting, but as we'll see in this presentation, there are some very surprising things an attacker can do by exploiting CEC software implementations. Then there's something called HEC or HDMI Ethernet Connection, which allows devices to establish an Ethernet connection of up to 100Mbit/s over their HDMI connections (newer HDMI standards raise the speed to 1Gbit/s). Don't think your mobile phone implements CEC? You might be wrong. Most modern Android-based phones and tablets have a Slimport(r) connection that supports HDMI-CEC. Ever heard of MHL (Mobile High-Definition Link)? Think Samsung and HTC (among other) mobile devices, and many JVC, Kenwood, Panasonic, and Sony car stereos – as many as 750 million devices in the world so far. Guess what? MHL supports HDMI-CEC as well. Let's explore, and own, this attack space. Speaker Bios: Kernelsmith is senior vulnerability researcher with Hewlett-Packard Security Research (HPSR). In this role, he analyzes and performs root-cause analysis on hundreds of vulnerabilities submitted to the Zero-Day Initiative (ZDI) program, which represents the world’s largest vendor-agnostic bug bounty program. His focus includes analyzing and performing root-cause analysis on hundreds of zero-day vulnerabilities submitted by ZDI researchers from around the world. Joshua is also a developer for the Metasploit Framework and has spoken at a few conferences and holds a few certifications. Prior to joining HP, Smith served in the U.S. Air Force in various roles including as an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Crew Commander and Instructor, but more relevantly as a penetration tester for the 92d Information Warfare Aggressor Squadron. Post-military, he became a security engineer at the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, where he began contributing to the Metasploit Framework. Smith performed research into weapons systems vulnerabilities as well as evasion and obfuscation techniques to add depth and realism to security device tests. Smith received a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and an M.A. in Management of Information Systems from the University of Great Falls. Smith was drawn to ZDI for the chance to work with a world-wide network of security researchers while continuing his own vulnerability research. When not researching software vulnerabilities, Josh enjoys raising his two young hackers-to-be and watching sci-fi since he can't play sports anymore (there's no tread left on his knees). Twitter: @kernelsmith, @thezdi

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: High Def Fuzzing: Exploring Vulnerabilities in HDMI-CEC


Secure Messaging for Normal People

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Secure" messaging programs and protocols continue to proliferate, and crypto experts can debate their minutiae, but there is very little information available to help the rest of the world differentiate between the different programs and their features. This talk will discuss the types of attacks various secure messaging features can defend against so those who are tech-savvy but not crypto-experts can make informed decisions on which crypto applications to use. This talk is intended for people with no preexisting cryptography knowledge. There will be no math or programming knowledge required. The goal is to explain secure messaging concepts such as PKI, PFS, and key validation without diving into heavier crypto, math, or programming content. Speaker Bio: Justin Engler is a Principal Security Engineer with NCC Group. Justin has been involved in application security assessments of many open and closed source messaging applications and other related technologies. He has spoken previously at DEF CON, BlackHat, Toorcon, and other regional events. Justin has 5 years of security consulting experience and has been involved in security, software development, and IT professionally for over 10 years

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: For several years I developed and utilized various technologies and methods to track criminals leading to at least two dozen convictions. In the process of recovering stolen devices, larger crimes would be uncovered including drugs, theft rings, stolen cars, even a violent car jacking. Much of the evidence in these cases would be collected by stolen devices themselves, such as network information, photos captured from laptops and cell phones, but often times there was additional data that would need to be gathered for a conviction. In this presentation I will walk through actual real cases and discuss in depth the technologies used and additional processes I went through utilizing open source data and other methods to target criminals. I will also discuss how these same tools and methods can be used against the innocent and steps users and developers can take to better protect privacy. In this presentation here are a few examples of cases I worked on which I will reveal details of: How a theft ring targeting Portland, Oregon schools was unveiled leading to multiple convictions How I tracked and recovered $9K worth of stolen camera equipment sold multiple times a year after it was stolen based on data extracted from images online How mobile phones stolen from a wireless store were tracked leading to the arrest of a theft ring, leading to the conviction of six people and the recovery of a stolen car Embedding of custom designed trojan for thermal imaging devices for theft tracking and export controls Tracking of a stolen flash drive to a university computer lab and correlation of security camera and student access ID cards Tracking a stolen laptop across state lines and how I gathered mountains of evidence in another theft ring case Several other cases…. Speaker Bio: Ken is a security analyst and "creative technologist" with 15 years experience building and breaking things through the use/misuse of technology. His technology exploits and endeavors have been featured in Forbes, Good Morning America, Dateline, the New York Times and others. He has worked with law enforcement and journalists utilizing various technologies to unveil organized crime rings, recover stolen cars, even a car jacking amongst other crimes.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Confessions of a Professional Cyber Stalker


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Rocking the Pocket Book: Hacking Chemical Plant for Competition and Extortion Marina Krotofil Senior Security Consultant. European Network for Cyber Security Jason Larsen Principal Security Consultant, IOActive The appeal of hacking a physical process is dreaming about physical damage attacks lighting up the sky in a shower of goodness. Let’s face it, after such elite hacking action nobody is going to let one present it even at a conference like DEF CON. As a poor substitute, this presentation will get as close as using a simulated plant for Vinyl Acetate production for demonstrating a complete attack, from start to end, directed at persistent economic damage to a production site while avoiding attribution of production loss to a cyber-event. Such an attack scenario could be useful to a manufacturer aiming at putting competitors out of business or as a strong argument in an extortion attack. Picking up a paper these days it’s easy to find an article on all the “SCADA insecurity” out there associated with an unstoppable attacker with unsophisticated goal of kicking up another apocalypse. Sorry to disappoint excited crowd but formula “Your wish is my command” does not work for control systems. The target plant is not designed in a hacker friendly way. Hopefully by the end of the presentation, the audience will understand the difference between breaking into the system and breaking the system, obtaining control and being in control. An attacker targeting a remote process is not immediately gifted with complete knowledge of the process and the means to manipulate it. In general, an attacker follows a series of stages before getting to the final attack. Designing an attack scenario is a matter of art as much as economic consideration. The cost of attack can quickly exceed damage worth. Also, the attacker has to find the way to compare between competing attack scenarios. In traditional IT hacking, a goal is to go undetected. In OT (operational technologies) hacking this is not an option. An attack will change things in the real world that cannot be removed by simply erasing the log files. If a piece of equipment is damaged or if a plant suddenly becomes less profitable, it will be investigated. The attacker has to create forensic footprint for investigators by manipulating the process and the logs in such a way that the analysts draw the wrong conclusions. Exploiting physical process is an exotic and hard to develop skill which have so far kept a high barrier to entry. Therefore real-world control system exploitation has remained in the hands of a few. To help the community mastering new skills we have developed „Damn Vulnerable Chemical Process“ – first open source framework for cyber-physical experimentation based on two realistic models of chemical plants. Come to the session and take your first master class on complex physical hacking. Speaker Bios: Marina is Senior Security Consultant at European Network for Cyber Security. Through her life she has accumulated vast hands-on experience in several engineering fields. Most recently she completed her doctoral degree in ICS security at Hamburg University of Technology, Germany. Her research over the last few years has been focused on the bits and peac.hes of the design and implementation of cyber-physical attacks aiming at both physical and economic damage. Marina used her pioneering destructive knowledge for designing process-aware defensive solutions and risk assessment approaches. During her PhD she collaborated with several industrial partners, participated in EU projects and collaborated with cool dudes from the hacking community. She has written more than a dozen papers on the subject of cyber-physical exploitation. Marina gives workshops on cyber-physical exploitation and is a frequent speaker at the leading ICS security and hacking venues around the world. She holds MBA in Technology Management, MSc in Telecommunications and MSc in Information and Communication Systems. Jason Larsen is a professional hacker that specializes in critical infrastructure and process control systems. Over the last several years he has been doing focused research into remote physical damage. Jason graduated from Idaho State University where he worked doing Monte Carlo and pharmacokinetic modeling for Boron-Neutron Capture Therapy. He was one of the founding members of the Cyber-Security department at the Idaho National Labs, which hosts the ICS -CERT and the National SCADA Tested .Jason has audited most of the major process control and SCADA systems as well as having extensive experience doing penetration tests against live systems. His other activities include two years on the Window 7 penetration testing team, designing the anti-malware system for a very large auction site, and building anonymous relay networks. He is currently a Principle Security Consultant for IOActive in Seattle.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Rocking the Pocket Book: Hacking Chemical Plants for Competition and Extortion


GPS Spoofing: low-cost GPS emulator

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: It is known that GPS L1 signal is unencrypted so that someone can produce or replay the fake GPS signal to make GPS receivers get wrong positioning results. There are many companies provide commercial GPS emulators, which can be used for the GPS spoofing, but the commercial emulators are quite expensive, or at least not free. Now we found by integrating some open source projects related to GPS we can produce GPS signal through SDR tools, e.g. USRP / bladeRF. This makes the attack cost very low. It may influence all the civilian use GPS chipset. In this presentation, the basic GPS system principle, signal structure, mathematical models of pseudo-range and Doppler effect will be introduced. The useful open source projects on Internet will be shared with attendees. Speaker Bios: HUANG Lin is a wireless security researcher, from Unicorn Team of Qihoo 360 China. Before entering Qihoo, she worked for telecom operator Orange, for 9 years, as a wireless researcher. Her interests include the security issues in wireless communication, especially the cellular network security, and also other problems in ADS-B, GPS, Bluetooth, Wifi, and automotive electronics. Twitter: @huanglin_bupt She is one of the earliest users of USRP in China, and keeps active in SDR/USRP research and development since 2006. She contributed to several UMTS/LTE soft base station projects, e.g. Open Air Interface. In 2009, She wrote one free e-book for GNU Radio training, which is very popular in China. YANG Qing is the team leader of Unicorn Team in Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd. He has rich experiences in wireless and hardware security area, including WiFi penetration testing, cellular network interception, IC card cracking etc. His interests also cover embedded system hacking, firmware reversing, automotive security, and software radio. He is the first one who reported the vulnerabilities of WiFi system and RF IC card system used in Beijing subway.

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: In a world full of targeted attacks and complex exploits this talk explores an attack that can simplified so even the most non-technical person can understand, yet the potential impact is massive: Ever wonder what would happen if one of the millions of bits in memory flipped value from a 0 to a 1 or vice versa? This talk will explore abusing that specific memory error, called a bit flip, via DNS. The talk will cover the various hurdles involved in exploiting these errors, as well as the costs of such exploitation. It will take you through my path to 1.3 million mis-directed queries a day, purchasing hundreds of domain names, wildcard SSL certificates, getting banned from payment processors, getting banned from the entire Comcast network and much more. Speaker Bio: Luke Young (@innoying) - is a freshman undergraduate student pursuing a career in information security. As an independent researcher, he has investigated a variety of well-known products and network protocols for design and implementation flaws. His research at various companies has resulted in numerous CVE assignments and recognition in various security Hall of Fames. He currently works as an Information Security Intern at LinkedIn. Twitter: @innoying

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Investigating the Practicality and Cost of Abusing Memory Errors with DNS


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Numerous botnets employ domain generation algorithms (DGA) to dynamically generate a large number of random domain names from which a small subset is selected for their command and control. A vast majority of DGA algorithms create random sequences of characters. In this work we present a novel language-based technique for detecting strings that are generate by chaining random characters. To evaluate randomness of a given string (domain name in this context) we lookup substrings of the string in the dictionary that we’ve built for this technique, and then we calculate a randomness score for the string based on several different factors including length of the string, number of languages that cover the substrings, etc. This score is used for determining whether the given string is a random sequence of characters. In order to evaluate the performance of this technique, on the one hand we use 9 known DGA algorithms to create random domain names as DGA domains, and on the other hand we use domain names from the Alexa 10,000 as likely non-DGA domains. The results show that our technique is more than 99% accurate in detecting random and non-random domain names. Speaker Bio: Mahdi Namazifar is currently a Senior Data Scientist with Talos team of Cisco Systems' San Francisco Innovation Center (SFIC). He graduated his PhD in Operations Research from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2011. His PhD work was on theoretical and computational aspects of mathematical optimization. During his PhD Mahdi was also affiliated with Wisconsin Institute for Discovery (WID) and the French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation (INRIA). Also he was a National Science Foundation (NFS) Grantee at the San Diego Supercomputer Center in 2007 and a Research Intern at IBM T.J. Watson Research Lab in 2008. After graduate school and before his current position at Cisco he was a Scientist at Opera Solutions working on applications of machine learning in a variety of problems coming from industries such as healthcare and finance.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Detecting random strings; a language based approach


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: In the past year, I found myself immersed in the multi-billion dollar digital advertising industry. This gave me the opportunity to investigate the unique security challenges and issues facing the industry. It was a shock to me at first how complex the advertising ecosystem was particularly in the advent of programmatic advertising. But I dove in head first and learned a lot which I would like to share with my fellow security professionals. During this time, I got involved with unscrupulous publishers, apathetic ad networks, angry advertisers and activist malware researchers. I encountered self proclaimed experts with fantastic claims, vendors using scare tactics, and a glaring disconnect between the security and ad tech worlds. In this presentation, I would like to be able to provide the audience with my experience plus a number of things. Among which are: Provide security professionals a 101 type of introduction to the world of digital advertising ecosystem. Among the things we will tackle is what is programmatic advertising, what the roles are of the different players like ad networks are and how money is made off all this interplay. Provide the audience a perspective on what security challenges the advertising industry is facing and opportunities for us security professionals to be involved. We all know about malvertising and its a big deal to us security guys but there are bigger, and in an advertisers perspective, more relevant issues that needs to be taken care of first. All of this will be discussed in this talk. An introduction about the different and creative ways unscrupulous publishers can pad their earnings. We will be talking about hidden ads, ad stacking, intrusive ads, auto-refreshes, popups, popunders, blackhat SEO techniques and dirty inventory. An in depth discussion on the problems caused by non-human traffic (NHT). We will talk about what it is, why is it a problem, how it is generated, and more importantly, how do we catch it? In fact, this presentation is named the “Bieber Project” which is the experiment which I leveraged to understand non-human traffic and determine how we can identify it. Speaker Bio: Mark Ryan Talabis is the Chief Security Scientist for zVelo Inc where he conducts research on advertising fraud and non-human traffic. He is also formerly the Director of the Cloud Business Unit of FireEye. He is an alumni member of the Honeynet Project and a member of the anti-malware working group of the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) where he is contributing in the promotion of threat intel sharing across the advertising industry. His current work focuses on helping the advertisers and ad networks in finding ways to identify non-human traffic through various browser impression and behavioral based anomaly detection techniques. This also includes work on detecting various impression and click padding techniques by unscrupulous publishers. He is a graduate of Harvard University and is a co-author of two books from Elsevier Syngress: "Information Security Analytics: Finding Security Insights, Patterns, and Anomalies in Big Data" (2014) and "Information Security Risk Assessment Toolkit: Practical Assessments through Data Collection and Data Analysis" (2012). Techniqies He has presented in various security and academic conferences and organizations around the world including Blackhat, DEF CON, Shakacon, INFORMS, INFRAGARD, ISSA, and ISACA.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: The Bieber Project: Ad Tech and Fraud 101


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Over the past few years state-sponsored hacking has received attention that would make a rockstar jealous. Discussion of malware has shifted in focus from ‘cyber crime’ to ‘cyber weapons’, there have been intense public debates on attribution of various high profile attacks, and heated policy discussion surrounding regulation of offensive tools. We’ve also seen the sale of ‘lawful intercept’ malware become a global trade. While a substantial focus has revolved around the activities of China, Russia, and Iran, recent discoveries have revealed the capabilities of Western nations such as WARRIORPRIDE aka. Regin (FVEY) and SNOWGLOBE aka. Babar (France). Many have argued that digital operations are a logical, even desirable part of modern statecraft. The step from digital espionage to political persecution is, however, a small one. Commercially written, offensive software from companies like FinFisher and Hacking Team has been sold to repressive regimes under the guise of ‘governmental intrusion’ software. Nation state hacking operations are frequently well-funded, difficult to attribute, and rarely prosecuted even if substantive evidence can be discovered. While efforts have been made to counter this problem, proof is hard to find and even more difficult to correctly interpret. This creates a perfect storm of conditions for lies, vendor lies, and flimsy attribution. In this talk we will unveil the mess happening backstage when uncovering nation state malware, lead the audience on the track of actor attribution, and cover what happens when you find other players on the hunt. We will present a novel approach to binary stylometry, which helps matching binaries of equal authorship and allows credible linking of binaries into the bigger picture of an attack. After this session the audience will have a better understanding of what happened behind the scenes when the next big APT report surfaces. Speaker Bios: Morgan Marquis-Boire is a Senior Researcher at the Citizen Lab, University of Toronto. He is the Director of Security for First Look Media and a contributing writer for The Intercept. Prior to this, he worked on the security team at Google. He is a Special Advisor to the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco and an Advisor to the United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute. In addition to this, he serves as a member of the Freedom of the Press Foundation advisory board and as an advisor to Amnesty International. Marion is a malware reverse engineer on duty for Cyphort Inc., focussing on the analysis of emerging threats and exploring novel methods of threat detection. She teaches malware analysis at University of Applied Sciences St. Pölten and frequently appears as speaker at international conferences. Two years ago Marion won Halvar Flake's reverse engineering challenge for females, since then she set out to threaten cyber criminals. She practices martial arts and has a vivid passion for taking things apart. Preferably, other people's things. Claudio is a security researcher mostly specialized in the analysis of malware, botnets and computer attacks in general. He's a core member of The Honeynet Project and created the open source malware analysis software Cuckoo Sandbox and Viper and runs the Malwr free service. Claudio published abundant research on botnets and targeted attacks and presented at conferences such as Hack In The Box, BlackHat, Chaos Communication Congress and many more. In recent years he devoted his attention especially on issues of privacy and surveillance and published numerous articles on surveillance vendors such as FinFisher and HackingTeam with the Citizen Lab as well as on NSA/GCHQ and Five Eyes surveillance capabilities with The Intercept and Der Spiegel. Claudio also contributes to Global Voices Advocacy. He continuously researches and writes on government surveillance and threats to journalists and dissidents worldwide and supports human rights organisations with operational security and emergency response.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Big Game Hunting: Peculiarities in Nation State Malware Research


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: You are predictable. Your passwords are predictable, and so are your PINs. This fact is being used by the hackers, as well as the agencies watching you. But what about your Android lock patterns? Can who you are reveal what patterns you create? This presentation will present the result from an analysis of 3400 user-selected patterns. The interesting part is that we collected additional information about the respondents, not just the patterns themselves. Will being left-handed and having experience with security affect the way you create your lock patterns? There are 389,112 possible patterns. Your full device encryption won't save you if your lock pattern is L - as in "loser". Speaker Bio: Marte has just finished her master degree in computer science at the Norwegian University of Technology and Science and has discovered the beauty of security. She likes passwords and colors, resulting in a special interest in graphical passwords. She is probably the only person that has survived after studying the Android Pattern Lock for a whole year.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Tell me who you are and I will tell you your lock pattern


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Your private drone opens up limitless possibilities – how can manufacturers and policymakers ensure you are able to realize them? As private drone ownership becomes the norm, drone makers and lawmakers will need to make important policy decisions that account for the privacy and free speech issues raised by this new technology. What legal and technical rules are being considered right now, and how might they affect your ability to do things like record footage at a city park, monitor police at a protest, or fly near a government building? These decisions will dictate the technical limitations (or lack thereof) placed on drones, and the legal consequences of operating them. Join Eric Cheng, General Manager of DJI SF and DJI's Director of Aerial Imaging, and Matt Cagle, a Technology and Civil Liberties Policy Attorney with the ACLU of Northern California, to discuss the policy issues at this leading edge of law and consumer technologies. Speaker Bios: Matt Cagle is a Technology and Civil Liberties Policy Attorney at the ACLU of Northern California. At the ACLU-NC, Matt's work focuses on the privacy and free speech issues raised by new services and technologies, including surveillance equipment, social media services, and connected devices. Last fall, Matt co-authored Making Smart Decisions About Surveillance: A Guide for Communities, a paper that provides a framework for communities considering surveillance technology proposals. Matt has worked in private practice advising technology companies on the privacy issues related to new products and services. Matt has substantial experience responding to state and federal law enforcement requests for online user information, and he co-authored reddit's first ever transparency report. Matt regularly speaks at conferences ranging from SXSW to RightsCon, and he served on the privacy committee for Oakland's controversial surveillance complex, the Domain Awareness Center. He grew up in Southern Arizona, studied Latin American history in Guatemala, and holds a JD from Stanford Law School. Twitter: @matt_cagle Eric Cheng is an award-winning photographer and publisher, and is the Director of Aerial Imaging and General Manager of the San Francisco office at DJI, the creators of the popular Phantom aerial-imaging quadcopter. Throughout his career, Cheng has straddled passions for photography, entrepreneurship, technology and communication. He publishes Wetpixel.com, the leading underwater-photography community on the web, and writes about his aerial-imaging pursuits at skypixel.org. His work as a photographer has been featured at the Smithsonian's Natural History Museum and in many media outlets including Wired, Outdoor Photographer, Popular Photography, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Make, ABC, Good Morning America, CBS, CNN and others. His video work has been shown on the Discovery Channel, National Geographic Channel, and on virtually every news network around the world. Caught between technical and creative pursuits, Eric holds bachelor's and master's degrees in computer science from Stanford University, where he also studied classical cello performance. He leads regular photography expeditions and workshops around the world, and has given seminars and lectures internationally at events including TEDx, the Churchill Club, Photoshelter Luminance, CES, SXSW, AsiaD, DEMA, and others. Twitter: @echeng

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Who Will Rule the Sky: The Coming Drone Policy Wars


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Exploring the phone system was once the new and exciting realm of “phone phreaks,” an ancestor of today’s computer “hackers.” The first phreaks “owned” and explored the vague mysteries of the telephone network for a time until their activities drew too much attention from the phone companies and law enforcement. The phone system evolved, somewhat, in an attempt to shut them out, and phreaking became both difficult and legally dangerous. Such events paralleled a new personal computer “revolution” wherein phone phreaks made the transition from the secret subtleties of telephony to the new and mystical frontier of personal computing. Private BBS(s) and, eventually, the Internet was not only the next logical step forward, but also provided “safer” alternatives that still allowed for the thrill of exploring the mysteries of a new modern age. Telephony, and voice security in general, became, as the years passed, something of a lost art to all but those who remember… In this presentation we begin our adventure with a journey back in time, starting in the post-war Film Noir era of the 40’s and 50’s, when users required an operator at the switchboard to make a call, investigating some of the early roots of phreaking that many have forgotten. We will briefly take a look at the weaknesses of early telephone systems and the emergence of the original phreaks in the 50’s and 60’s who found and exploited them. Our journey will also allow us to demonstrate how some of the same basic phreaking approaches are still applicable to today’s "advanced" VoIP systems. Certainly the initial creation and emergence of VoIP opened a variety of attack vectors that were covered at security conferences at the time. Commercial VoIP adoption, however, remained stagnant until standards and carriers caught up. Some VoIP hacking tools were left unmaintained, and VoIP wasn’t the sexy and mysterious attack vector it once was with the exception of tricksters who found old or insecure systems to be easy targets. Due to increased VoIP adoption over the last few years, however, telephony attacks are provocative once again. As hardboiled VoIP detectives, we’ll unravel the mysteries of the curious, shadowy, and secretive world of phreaks, tricksters, and VoIP hackers. We’ll compare and contrast old school phreaking with new advances in VoIP hacking. We’ll explain how voice systems are targeted, how they are attacked using old and new methods, and how to secure them - with demonstrations along with practical and actionable tips along the way. We may even drop a new VoIP telephony phishing tool to fuse the past and the present.. Speaker Bios: Patrick spoke about telephony fraud last year at DEF CON Skytalks (“How To Make Money Fast Using A Pwned PBX”), and is a #telephreak at heart. He has over twenty years of experience, mostly with telecom manufacturers, and spent time in charge of product security for the communications security business of a fortune 100 company. When not working you can find him practicing Kung Fu, brewing beer, or picking locks with Oak City Locksport. Twitter: @unregistered436 Owen used to be a professional developer code monkey. He’s worked in various IT fields including Server Administration, DevOps, Application Security and most recently as a penetration tester. He enjoys tinkering with various technologies, and has experimented for prolonged periods with PBXs and the obscure side of VoIP.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Sorry Wrong Number: Mysteries Of The Phone System Past and Present


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: As the leading federal agency responsible for protecting your privacy rights online, technology is at the core of the Federal Trade Commission's work. You may be familiar with the agency's enforcement actions against some of the world's biggest tech companies for privacy/data security violations - but you may not know how your research skills can inform its investigations and policy. Come hear about some of the Commission's recent tech-related actions, research and reports, plus how its work impacts both consumers and businesses. You'll also learn how you can directly or indirectly help the agency protect consumers, guide businesses to develop better/strong data security, and much more. Speaker Bios: Terrell McSweeny serves as a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission - sometimes referred to as the Federal Technology Commission. This year marks her second DEF CON adventure. When it comes to tech issues, Commissioner McSweeny wants companies to implement security by design, to be transparent about their data collection practices, and to give consumers as much control as possible. Twitter: @TMcSweenyFTC Ashkan Soltani serves as the FTC's fourth Chief Technologist. He is a privacy and security researcher whose work draws attention to privacy problems online, demystifies technology for the non-technically inclined, and provides data-driven insights to help inform policy. Ashkan was recognized as part of the 2014 Pulitzer winning team at the Washington Post and was the primary technical consultant on the Wall Street Journal's "What They Know" investigative series on online privacy. Twitter: @TechFTC

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: How to Hack Government: Technologists as Policy Makers


Put on Your Tinfo_t Hat

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: The IDA Pro APIs for interacting with type information are full of opportunities (horrible problems). I will show you how to create unparseable types, how to apply these types to functions and variables and how to transfer these types from one IDB to another. Speaker Bio: miaubiz is a senior doctor of security at Azimuth Security. he has previously found bugs in web browsers and has spoken at SyScan, Infiltrate, T2. his interests are bad APIs and sniffing ARMpits.

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Organizations continue to unknowingly leak trade secrets on the Internet. To those in the know, these leaks are a valuable source of competitive intelligence. This talk describes how the speaker collects competitive intelligence for his own online retail business. Specifically, you learn how he combines, trends, and analyzes information within specific contexts to manufacture useful data that is real, but technically doesn't exist on it's own. For example, you will learn about the trade secrets that are hidden within sequential numbers, how he uses collected intelligence to procure inventory, and how and why he gauges the ongoing health of his industry and that of his competitors. And on a related note, you'll also learn how the federal government nearly exposed an entire generation to identity fraud. Speaker Bio: Michael Schrenk has presented six DEF CON talks on intelligence and organizational privacy, including last year's talk "You're Leaking Trade Secrets". He has developed Internet-based intelligence campaigns since 1995 for organizations as diverse as: Fortune 500 Companies, Private Investigators, Asian Art Dealers, and Investigative Journalists. His adventures in intelligence have taken him around the world, with speaking opportunities in The Middle East, Eastern Europe, The UK, Silicon Valley, and most places in between. Mike is also the author of "Webbots, Spiders, and Screen Scrapers (2007 & 2012, No Starch Press, San Francisco)". He is again teaming with No Starch Press to write a non-technical Intelligence and Counterintelligence book scheduled for publication in Q1 2016.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Applied Intelligence: Using information that isn't there


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: 35C3 is run by teams of volunteers. In this event, they will provide some insight into the challenges they faced while building the GSM, DECT and IP networks, running video streams, or organizing ticket sales. All graphs will be pointing up and to the right.

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Infrastructure Review: Up and to the right: All the statistics about this event you could wish for


keywords: laser hbz electronicressourcemanagement

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

uk: Бібліотекознавство, документознавство

en: Information and Library Sciences

de: Geisteswissenschaften

uk: Гуманітарні науки

en: Humanities

description: LAS:eR ist eine hbz Dienstleistung und ist ein Arbeitsinstrument für die Verwaltung von eRessourcen. Was ist mit LAS:eR möglich und ist die Vernetzung von konsortialen und lokalen Lizenzen geglückt?

@language: de

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Vom DFG-Projekt zur produktiven Dienstleistung – LAS:eR vernetzt sich!

Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB)

addressCountry: DE

addressLocality: Hanover

addressRegion: Lower Saxony

name: Berufsverband Information Bibliothek e. V. (BIB)


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: In the last year there's been an explosion of electric skateboards onto the market- seemingly volleyed into popularity by the Boosted Boards kickstarter. Following on from the success of their original Boosted Board exploit, the team went on to get their hands on the other popular boards on the market, and predictably broke all of them. Richo and Mike will investigate the security of several popular skateboards, including Boosted's flagship model and demonstrate several vulnerabilities that allow complete control of a an unmodified victim's skateboard, as well as other attacks on the firmware of the board and controller directly. Speaker Bios: Richo likes his ducks flat and his instruction sets reduced. By day he works at Stripe as a security engineer, by night he writes (lots of) open source code, on everything from the rust compiler to debugging aids like voltron. Twitter: @rich0H Mike Ryan is a computer jerk who gets paid to do stupid crap like this. He spends roughly 40 hours a week steamrolling through eBay's network and likes to relax at home by sniffing Bluetooth. Twitter: @mpeg4codec

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Hacking electric skateboards: vehicle research for mortals


I am a packer and so can you

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Automating packer and compiler/toolchain detection can be tricky and best and downright frustrating at worst. The majority of existing solutions are old, closed source or aren’t cross platform. Originally, a method of packer identification that leveraged some text analysis algorithms was presented. The goal is to create a method to identify compilers and packers based on the structural changes they leave behind in PE files. This iteration builds upon previous work of using assembly mnemonics for packer detection and grouping. New features and analysis are covered for identification and clustering of PE files. Speaker Bio: Mike Sconzo has been around the Security Industry for quite some time, and is interested in creating and implementing new methods of detecting unknown and suspicious network activity as well as different approaches for file/malware analysis. This includes looking for protocol anomalies, patterns of network traffic, and various forms of static and dynamic file analysis. He works on reversing malware, tool creation for analysis, and threat intelligence. Currently a lot of his time is spent doing data exploration and tinkering with statistical analysis and machine learning.

uk: вхід без авторизації


DARPA

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: For 22 years, the best binary ninjas in the world have gathered at DEF CON to play the world’s most competitive Capture-the-Flag. At DEF CON 24, DARPA will challenge machines to play this game for the first time, with the winner taking home a $2 million prize. This talk will include a first public look at the machines, teams, technology, and visualization behind Cyber Grand Challenge. The technology: machines that discover bugs and build patches? We’re bringing our qualifier results to show just how real this is. The teams: we’ll talk about the finalists who prevailed to make it to the CGC final round. Visualization: the product of CTF players working with game designers, this talk will include a live interactive demo of a graphical debugger for everyone that will let an audience follow along in real time. The machines: we’re bringing high performance computing to the DEF CON stage. The event: In 2016, machines will Capture the Flag! Follow DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge on Twitter: #DARPACGC Mike Walker joined DARPA as a program manager in January 2013. His research interests include machine reasoning about software in situ and the automation of application security lifecycles. Prior to joining DARPA, Mr. Walker worked in industry as a security software developer, Red Team analyst, enterprise security architect and research lab leader. As part of the Computer Science Corporation "Strikeforce" Red Team, Mr. Walker helped develop the HEAT Vulnerability Scanner and performed Red Team engagements. Serving as a principal at the Intrepidus Group, Mr. Walker worked on Red Teams that tested America's financial and energy infrastructure for security weaknesses. Also, on the DARPA SAFER Red Team, Mr. Walker discovered flaws in prototype communications technologies. Mr. Walker has participated in various roles in numerous applied computer security competitions. He contributed challenges to DEF CON Capture the Flag (CTF) and competed on and led CTF teams at the highest levels of international competition. Mr. Walker was formerly a mentor of the Computer Security Competition Club at Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology (TJHSST). Jordan started his professional career at the University of Florida where he got to do a little bit of everything security related. His love of CTFs, however, drove him to a job at a government contractor where he honed his reverse engineering and vulnerability research skills. Now, his goal in life is to become a professional CTF e-sports caster so he founded a startup Vector 35 to try to get paid to do stuff with CTFs and gaming.

uk: вхід без авторизації


BURPKIT: Using WebKit to Own the Web

uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Today's web apps are developed using a mashup of client- and server-side technologies. Everything from sophisticated Javascript libraries to third-party web services are thrown into the mix. Over the years, we've been asked to test these web apps with security tools that haven't evolved at the same pace. A common short-coming in most of these tools is their inability to perform dynamic analysis to identify vulnerabilities such as dynamically rendered XSS or DOM-based XSS. This is where BurpKit comes in - a BurpSuite plugin that integrates the power of WebKit with that of BurpSuite. In this presentation we'll go over how one can leverage WebKit to write their own web pen-testing tools and introduce BurpKit. We'll show you how BurpKit is able to perform a variety of powerful tasks including dynamic analysis, BurpSuite scripting, and more! Best of all, the plugin will be free and open source so you can extended it to your heart's desire! Speaker Bio: Nadeem Douba is the founding principal of Red Canari, an information security consulting firm that specializes in the areas of technical security assessments. With over 15 years experience, Nadeem provides consulting and training services for organizations within the public and private sector. He has also presented at some of the world's largest security conferences and is the author of many well-known open source security tools, including PyMiProxy (used by the Internet Archive), Sploitego, and the Canari Framework (previously presented at DEF CON 20). His primary research interests include open source intelligence, application and operating system security, and big data.

uk: вхід без авторизації


uk: Комп'ютерні науки

description: Remember that web application you wrote when you where first learning PHP? Ever wonder how vulnerable that code base is? Through the perspective of an attacker you will see how SQL injection can lead to data loss and system compromise. This presentation will take you through the techniques and tools used to take control of a PHP web application starting from an injection point moving to PHP web shells, and ending with a Linux wildcard attack. Speaker Bio: Nemus works as a software engineer in the payment industry developing software that transfers money between banking systems. He is a founding member of 801 Labs, a hackerspace located in Salt Lake City, and is an active member of his local DEF CON group DC801. Nemus has a BS in Computer Science and is a certified GIAC Web Application Penetration Tester (GWAPT). Twitter: @Nemus801

uk: вхід без авторизації

name: Hacking SQL Injection for Remote Code Execution on a LAMP Stack